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Individuals describe their life experiences differently in response to their audience’s 
verbal and behavioral cues, which in turn, influences how the teller connects the experiences to 
the self-concept (Weeks & Pasupathi, 2011). Research on audience tuning (Higgins, 1992) 
suggests that one reason audiences influence communication is that people are motivated to form 
a shared reality with their audience (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005). Combining research on 
autobiographical memory with that on audience tuning, the current project considers how 
communicating about personal memories with others can affect how individuals describe and 
reflect on their autobiographical memories, and how motivation to form a shared reality with 
others affects this process. Experiment 1 examined the effects of audience perspective on event 
memory descriptions, memory topic attitudes, and the self-typicality of the described memory. In 
this experiment, participants were asked to think about a personal memory related to a specific 
topic and then, were randomly assigned to write about that experience for an audience that had 
either a positive or negative perspective on the topic or for an audience whose perspective is 
unknown. Experiment 2 examined whether the audience-bias effect occurs as a function of 
memory elaboration. Contrary to predictions, results of both experiments indicated that 
participants’ memory descriptions and self-typicality of the memories were not biased in the 
direction of their audience. However, as predicted, subsequent attitudes about the memory topic 
and event memory perceptions were biased in the direction of the audience’s perspective. 
Moreover, results of Experiment 2 indicated that the audience-bias effect was observed only 
when communicators were permitted to elaborate on their memories, indicating the importance 
of elaboration to the biasing process. In addition, across both experiments, the audience-bias 
effect was more pronounced for individuals who experienced greater shared reality with their 
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audience. This project highlights the importance of audience perspective and shared reality in 
relation to communication about self-relevant experiences.
1 
CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Autobiographical memories are recollections about personal past experiences. Like other 
types of memory, autobiographical memories are influenced by social factors, such as audience, 
that are salient at the time of retrieval (Marsh & Tversky, 2004; Tversky & Marsh, 2000). Thus, 
autobiographical memories are episodic by nature, both in the sense that they represent a specific 
time and space from one’s life and in the sense that each telling of the memory is influenced by 
the context in which it is told. When one describes an autobiographical event, the memory 
description becomes a product of the social interaction between the speaker and audience, which 
can then influence subsequent retellings of the described event (Pasupathi, 2001). The current 
project seeks to further understanding of the social aspects of autobiographical memory and how 
audience may influence how individuals come to perceive past experiences.  
Audience Tuning 
Good communicators consider the background knowledge, opinions, and attitudes of 
their audience and adjust their message accordingly (Higgins, 1992; Higgins, McCann & 
Fondacaro, 1982). The term audience refers to the message recipient(s) and may refer to a single 
or multiple individuals. At minimum, communicators must be able to establish a reference point 
with their audience and attempt to meet the audience’s basic informational needs. People tend to 
be quite adept at this. For example, even young children who were asked to describe objects 
automatically adjusted their object descriptions for people depending on whether the individuals 
were wearing a blindfold or not (Higgins, 1977).  
This process of audience tuning, or adjusting one’s message according to the audience, 
can have lasting effects on the communicator’s own perceptions of the message being 
communicated (Echterhoff, Higgins & Groll, 2005; Echterhoff, Kopietz & Higgins, 2013; 
Higgins, 1992). For instance, audience tuning has been shown to influence communicators’ own 
2 
 
memory of the message. Higgins (1992) first demonstrated this effect in a pair of studies. In the 
first study, participants received ambiguous information about a target person, for example, 
behaviors that can be characterized as either ‘stubborn’ or ‘persistent.’ Participants were then 
asked to describe the target person to an audience who had either received the same information 
or different information about the target person as they did. When participants believed the 
audience received the same information, they were more likely to focus on interpretation of the 
information rather than on description; however, when participants believed the audience 
received different information, they were more likely to focus on description than on 
interpretation of the information. As a result, participants who focused more on interpretation of 
the information had less accurate memories about the message than did participants who focused 
on simply describing the information.  
Higgins’ (1992) second study explored how the attitude of one’s audience may influence 
communication and thus, the communicator’s own beliefs. In a similar paradigm, participants 
received a list of ambiguous, positive, and negative behaviors performed by a target person and 
were asked to describe the target person to another student who ostensibly knew the target 
person. Participants were told that the student either liked or did not like the target person. 
Results of this study indicated that participants described the target person more positively when 
they believed their audience liked the target person than when they believed their audience 
disliked the target person. Consequently, participants’ own memory about the target person 
became more congruent with the view of their audience, an effect that was still apparent two 
weeks after the initial session. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that the process of 
audience tuning results in biasing of the communicators’ own memories and perceptions of the 




One reason that people are so willing to adjust their messages for their audience is that 
people are motivated to create a shared reality (Echterhoff, Higgins & Levine, 2009). Inherent in 
human nature is the desire to share and validate our experiences with others. Many of the classic 
studies within social psychology hinge on the desire for social verification (Asch, 1955; 
Festinger 1950; Lewin, 1943; Sherif, 1937). One way that people fulfill this need for social 
verification is to create a shared reality with others. A shared reality is a product of the motivated 
process to experience commonality with others’ inner states about the world (Echterhoff et al., 
2009). Thus, a shared reality may occur during communication as people share information 
about their own inner states relating to some target referent and, learn information about others’ 
inner states regarding the target referent (Hogg & Rinella, 2018).  
Shared reality serves both epistemic (i.e., understanding the world) and relational needs 
(i.e., connecting with others, Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz, & Groll, 2008). It is through the 
sharing of internal states such as attitudes, feelings, and emotions that people are able to take 
subjective experiences and create objective meaning and reality. According to Hardin and 
Higgins (1996), “When an experience is recognized and shared with others in the process of 
social interaction, it achieves reliability, validity, generality, and predictability” (p. 35-36). Just 
as a scientific discovery lacking in reliability, validity, generality, or predictability would not be 
upheld, it is argued that social experiences without a shared reality tend to be transitory and 
ephemeral (Hardin and Higgins, 1996).  
Memory Biases 
Due to the innate desire to establish commonality, as described above, individuals often 
express ideas that are contradictory to what they actually believe to be true (Asch, 1955; Larsen, 
1974). Moreover, people tend to believe what they say even when it lacks truthfulness, an effect 
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that Higgins (1999) termed the saying-is-believing effect. This effect is demonstrated in the 
classic audience tuning experiments described previously, where after describing a target person 
to an audience that either likes or dislikes the target person, the communicator’s own memory of 
the original information about the target person becomes biased toward the view of the audience. 
Audience tuning effects on memory have been consistently demonstrated across a number of 
studies (Echterhoff et al., 2005; Echterhoff et al., 2008; Echterhoff, Kopietz & Higgins, 2013; 
Higgins, 1992; Higgins, 1999).  
Audience tuning is also consistent with previous research that indicates that elaboration 
of one’s beliefs through writing can alter one’s mental representations about the message 
(Echterhoff et al., 2009) and can increase belief perseverance (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980). 
To examine whether message elaboration (i.e., a coherent description of the message to the 
audience) is necessary for the audience-bias effect to occur, participants read an ambiguous 
passage about a target person and were told that they would be asked to describe the target 
person to another student who ostensibly either liked or did not like the target person (Higgins, 
Echterhoff, Crespillo, & Kopietz, 2007). They were told that their oral descriptions would be 
recorded. However, only half of the participants actually described the target person and the 
other half of participants were told that the voice recorder was being used by another 
experimenter and that the study could go on without the description. Results demonstrated an 
audience-bias effect only for participants who elaborated such that for those who actually 
described the target person, more positive information was recalled when the audience liked the 
target person than when the audience did not like the target person, an effect that was not 
observed for those who did not provide oral descriptions.  
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The importance of message elaboration is also consistent with the elaboration likelihood 
model of persuasion, which posits that the more people elaborate on an opposing argument, the 
more likely the argument is to influence their attitudes (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). However, 
unlike persuasion, audience tuning effects occur without an explicit attempt to change people’s 
attitudes. Rather, one explanation for the saying-is-believing effect is that it represents a source 
monitoring error (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Schachter & Singer, 1962), or a 
misattribution of an outcome to something other than the legitimate source. Research shows that 
misattribution of information can impair and distort memories (Belli, Lindsay, Gales & 
McCarthy, 1994; Foley, Bays, Foy & Woodfield, 2015; McCabe & Geraci, 2009; Schacter, 
1999). In the case of audience tuning, people may misattribute the biased message as stemming 
from their own memory rather than stemming from the opinions of their audience (Higgins, 
1998).  
However, studies have also shown that the saying-is-believing effect is diminished under 
conditions that undermine a successful shared reality (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005). For 
instance, in one study participants were told that it was their audience’s task to identify a target 
person, whom the audience ostensibly already knew, based on the participant’s description of 
that target person. When communicators received feedback that the audience was not able to 
identify the target person based on the description, indicating that a shared reality was not 
achieved, communicators’ memories were not impacted by their audience. Therefore, it appears 
that audience is most likely to alter subsequent perceptions about a message under circumstances 
in which shared reality is created. Together, this evidence suggests that the audience-bias effect 
results from a source-monitoring error that is most likely to occur when individuals are also able 




Audience tuning has been applied primarily to communication about social attitudes, 
rather than to topics directly related to the self-concept. However, autobiographical memories are 
also often recounted with others. Applying audience tuning to the study of autobiographical 
memories can increase understanding of the processes through which people come to make sense 
of their own life experiences. Autobiographical memories have important implications for how 
people conceive who they are and how they came to be (Bluck, & Habermas, 2000). These 
memories function to provide individuals with self-definition, social connection, and direction 
for future behavior (Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005), functions that have been linked to 
an increased sense of purpose and positive social relationships (Waters, 2014). In addition, the 
manner in which people describe and reflect on their autobiographical memories has important 
implications for development and well-being (Adler, Lodi-Smith, Philippe & Houle, 2016; Bauer 
& McAdams, 2004). For instance, including descriptions of growth related goals when asked to 
describe important autobiographical memories was indicative of higher levels of maturity and 
personality development (Bauer & McAdams, 2004). Therefore, it is important for researchers to 
carefully examine the factors that influence the formation, communication, and perception of 
autobiographical memories.  
Social Influences of Autobiographical Memories 
Despite the intuitive notion that communication about one’s own personal past should be 
less susceptible, than communication about attitudes or social judgments, to the influence of 
social factors described above, research has shown that these memories are vulnerable to social 
influences. For instance, research on flashbulb memories shows that even the most vivid and 
traumatic memories can be distorted by subsequent information such as exposure to media or 
conversations after the event (Hirst & Phelps, 2016). Similarly, research on eyewitnesses to a 
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crime has shown that early recall of the event can increase later susceptibility to misinformation 
(Chan & Langley, 2011; Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009) and, in the case of identifying a 
suspect, post-identification feedback that the correct suspect was identified alters subsequent 
confidence and descriptions of the eyewitness’s memory (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). Taken 
together, research indicates that there are various ways in which external influences may reduce 
accuracy and consistency of autobiographical descriptions over time, even when the memory 
was vivid and experienced first-hand. 
Co-Construction 
Autobiographical memory scholars have begun to explore how audience influences the 
conversational retellings of autobiographical memories. Pasupathi (2001) proposed the principle 
of co-construction, which posits that both audience and communicators influence the way events 
are recounted in conversation. This process is also influenced by the social context in which the 
conversation occurs and is further constrained by prior tellings of the event. Moreover, the 
process of co-construction has long-term implications on how the memory is subsequently 
perceived and retold. To demonstrate the impact of audience on autobiographical retelling, 
Marsh and Tversky (2004) conducted a daily diary study where participants recorded what, 
when, and how they recounted events from their lives with others over a period of four weeks. 
Participants reported details about the original event along with details about the retelling. In this 
study, people reported naturally distorting sixty-one percent of their memory descriptions in 
some way, and they distorted their memory descriptions in different ways depending on the 
audience and the goal for telling.  
 Pasupathi and colleagues have shown that the behavior of the audience can also have 
important consequences on the memory recollection (e.g., Pasupathi & Billitteri, 2015; Pasupathi 
& Oldroyd, 2015; Pasupathi & Hoyt, 2009). For example, people tend to elaborate more when 
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describing a memory to an attentive audience than when describing a memory to a distracted 
audience (Pasupathi & Billitteri, 2015; Pasupathi & Oldroyd, 2015; Pasupathi & Hoyt, 2009). 
People are also more likely to include interpretive information when telling stories to an attentive 
audience and are more likely to include factual information when telling stories to a distracted 
audience (Pasupathi & Hoyt, 2009). These differences in retellings also lead to differences in 
subsequent memory recall. For instance, in one study participants watched film clips in the 
laboratory and then discussed the films with either attentive listeners or distracted listeners 
(Pasupathi, Stallworth, & Murdoch, 1998). Participants who discussed with attentive listeners 
elaborated more about the film clips, and also, remembered more information about the film 
clips even after a three-week delay, as compared to participants who discussed with distracted 
listeners.  
An audience not only influences how memories are told but can also influence how 
people connect past experiences to their current self. In one study, Jennings, Pasupathi, and 
McLean (2014) examined conversations between romantic partners in which one person revealed 
a previously undisclosed meaningful autobiographical memory to the other. The more responsive 
the audience was, the more connections the speaker made between the events in the memory and 
their current self (e.g., “I am a very compassionate person, which is why I helped my friend after 
her break-up”). In another study, Pasupathi and Rich (2005) found that speakers evaluated an 
experience that they initially reported as interesting to be less interesting after telling the 
experience to a distracted friend than after telling the experience to a responsive friend. The 
researchers concluded that a distracted audience undermined self-verification of the experience.  
In addition, Weeks and Pasupathi (2011) found that audience responsiveness predicts story 
elaboration, and that story elaboration is positively associated with self-integration, or the ability 
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to connect past events to the current self. Together, this work suggests that more engaged 
audiences elicit more elaboration which in turn, prompts the speaker to make more connections 
between the past experience and current self-perceptions.  
By applying what is known about the process of audience tuning to communication about 
self-relevant experiences, we may be able to better understand how the underlying processes of 
interpersonal communication helps shape autobiographical memories. Previous work on 
audience effects related to autobiographical memory has primarily focused on the observable 
behavior of audience, yet it is possible that there are various other ways in which an audience can 
influence the telling of a memory. It is also important to consider the ways in which describing 
memories to others shapes how individuals come to make sense of those experiences and how 
they might relate the experiences to the self-concept. The current project sought to explore how 
the process of audience tuning might apply to autobiographical memories and how audience 
perspective influences perceptions of real-life experiences.  
The Present Research 
The literature discussed thus far suggests that when communicating about an attitude 
topic, communicators are often motivated to achieve a shared reality with their audience, and one 
way they do this is by tuning their message to be more consistent with the perspective of the 
audience (Echterhoff et al., 2009; Higgins, 1992; Higgins, McCann & Fondacaro). Moreover, 
research has shown that message elaboration via written or verbal methods can influence mental 
representations about the message (Echterhoff et al., 2009) and belief perseverance (Anderson et 
al., 1980). More specifically, message elaboration to an audience whose perspective is known 
leads to biases in the speaker’s own memory about the original message (Echterhoff et al., 2005; 
Echterhoff et al., 2013; Higgins, 1992).  
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The present project consisted of two experiments designed to examine whether similar 
processes operate when individuals describe their personal autobiographical memories to an 
audience. Experiment 1 examined whether audience perspective influences memory descriptions 
and subsequent perceptions related to the memory and self. Experiment 2 explored the 
underlying mechanism through which audience perspective may impact subsequent perceptions 
by assessing whether both awareness of the audience’s perspective and elaborative writing in a 
manner consistent with the audience’s perspective are necessary for the audience-bias effect to 
occur. 
In the first experiment, participants were asked to provide a written description of a 
personal memory to an audience who either had a positive or negative perspective about the 
topic, or whose perspective was unknown. It was predicted that people would tune their message 
(i.e., frame their description of their own life experience) to be consistent with the perspective of 
their audience. In particular, it was hypothesized that people would portray the experience more 
positively when writing for an audience with a positive attitude about the topic than when 
writing for an audience with a negative attitude about the topic. It was also hypothesized that 
people would rate the experience as more positive and self-typical after describing it to an 
audience with a positive perspective than when describing it to an audience with a negative 
perspective.  
The goal of Experiment 2 was to test the mechanism through which one’s audience 
influences perceptions of one’s own life experiences. Previous work on audience tuning suggests 
that mere awareness of the audience’s attitude is not sufficient to induce memory biases; rather, 
communicators must actively elaborate on the message either verbally or through writing 
(Higgins & Rholes, 1978). Therefore, Experiment 2 examined whether such conditions are also 
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necessary for individuals who are describing their own autobiographical experiences. It was 
hypothesized that audience would be less likely to influence perceptions of the memory when the 
communicator does not actually engage in the elaborative tuning process (i.e., exert the effort to 
coherently describe the message to the audience). The importance of elaboration on one’s own 
perceptions is consistent with research both on audience tuning (Higgins & Rholes, 1978) and on 
co-construction of memory (Pasupath & Rich, 2005). In addition, it was hypothesized that the 
relationship between elaboration and perceptions of the event would be mediated by perceived 
shared reality such that those who elaborated in a manner consistent with that of their audience 
would perceive greater shared reality with their audience which would in turn, lead to 
perceptions of the memory that are consistent with the audience.  
To be consistent with previous studies on audience tuning, it was important for the 
present project to utilize topics deemed evaluatively ambiguous (Echterhoff, Kopietz, Higgins, & 
Groll, 2008). Therefore, a pilot study was conducted to identify participants’ attitudes on various 
topics and the extent to which participants could easily think of an autobiographical experience 
related to each topic. In previous studies on audience tuning, researchers selected messages that 
elicited mean ratings close to the midpoint on evaluative attitudes, and the current project used a 







CHAPTER 2. PILOT STUDY 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 89 undergraduate students from Iowa State University who received 
course credit for participation. To be eligible to participate in this study, participants were 
required to be at least 18 years of age. The sample included 53 women and 35 men. The majority 
of the sample (75.3%) identified as Caucasian (1.1% Native American, 3.4% African-American, 
10.1% Latino/Hispanic, 13.5% Asian/Pacific Islander, 1.1% Indian, and 2.2% identified as 
Other), with a mean age of 19.81 years, SD = 1.48. 
Procedure 
Participants were seated at individual cubicles in the research laboratory. All measures 
were completed on a computer. After consenting to participate in the study, participants were 
asked a series of questions regarding their experiences related to six different topics. The topics 
were procrastination, social media, multitasking, lying, bragging, and group work, and they 
appeared in a randomized order. For each topic, participants were first provided with a definition 
of the topic and then were asked questions assessing their own and others’ attitudes on the topic. 
Because the primary experiments in this project examine how individuals might differentially 
reflect on a specific life experience, participants in the pilot study were asked about their own 
experiences with the topic such as the ease of which they could think of and describe a specific 
experience related to the topic, the positivity of their experiences related to the topic, the 
negativity of their experiences related to the topic, and the ease with which they can think of 
positive, and separately, negative consequences related to the topic. Questions were grouped by 
topic, with attitudes assessed first and personal experiences assessed second. After completing 
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measures for one topic (e.g., procrastination), participants were then presented with the next 
topic. After completing the dependent measures, participants were asked demographic questions 
(e.g., age, gender, racial/ethnic identity). After all measures were completed, participants were 
thanked for their participation and debriefed.  
Materials 
Piloted memory topics. The memory topics were procrastination, social media, 
multitasking, lying, bragging, and group work. For each topic, participants were provided with a 
definition and were then asked a series of questions, described more fully below. The definitions 
provided for the topics were as follows: a) Procrastination was defined as when a student delays 
or postpones doing an academic assignment until a later time, b) Social media was defined as 
any websites or applications that enable a person to create and share content or to participate in 
social networking, c) Multitasking was defined as when a person tries to do more than one task at 
a time, d) Lying was defined as purposefully communicating an untrue statement, e) Bragging 
was defined as talking about accomplishments in an arrogant or prideful manner, and f) Group 
work was defined as a product of working with others to collaborate on a project or assignment.  
Attitudes. Attitudes about each memory topic were measured by having participants 
indicate their response using a semantic differential scale assessing each topic. Scale endpoints 
were: positive/negative, like/dislike, good/bad, desirable/undesirable, beneficial/harmful, 
wise/foolish (Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994). For each word pair, participants rated the memory 
topic on a 7-point bipolar continuum. Responses were averaged to create a total attitude score for 
each topic (α = .88), with higher scores indicating a less favorable attitude toward the topic.  
 Because the subsequent experiments will involve participants writing about these topics 
to others, it was also important to examine perceptions of others’ attitudes about these topics. 
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Therefore, using the same semantic differential scale, participants were also asked to indicate 
how they perceived: a) a typical university student’s attitude toward each memory topic, and b) a 
typical university professor’s attitude toward each memory topic. Scores were averaged across 
items to create an overall perceived student attitude score for each topic and an overall perceived 
professor attitude score for each topic. 
Personal experience measures. To ensure that memory prompts used in the primary 
studies would elicit experiences that participants could easily bring to mind, participants were 
asked to indicate the degree to which they were able to recall a specific personal experience 
related to each memory topic. First, participants were asked if they had personal experience with 
the topic using a dichotomous yes/no response (e.g., Have you ever procrastinated on an 
assignment?). Then, participants were asked to rate their ease of recollection (e.g., How easily 
can you bring to mind a specific experience in which you engaged in procrastination?) and their 
ease of description (e.g., How easy would it be for you to write a description of this experience 
for an experimenter to read?), both items were assessed on a scale from 1 (not easily at all or 
very difficult) to 7 (very easily or very easy).  
Moreover, because the primary studies would manipulate whether the audience has a 
positive or negative perspective on each topic, it was important to also ensure that selected 
memory prompts would have the potential to elicit both positive and negative responses in the 
research participants. Thus, participants also rated the positivity of their experience with the 
topic (e.g., When you think of a time that you procrastinated on an academic assignment, how 
positive is the memory?) on a scale from 1 (not at all positive) to 7 (extremely positive) and the 
negativity of the experience was on a scale from 1 (not at all negative) to 7 (extremely negative). 
Participants were then asked to list as many positive consequences that they could think of 
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related to each topic and as many negative consequences that they could think of related to each 
topic, five free response boxes were provided for each type of consequence. Participants then 
rated the ease with which they could think of positive consequences on a scale from 1 (very 
difficult) to 7 (very easy) and the ease with which they could think of negative consequences on 
a scale of 1 (very difficult) to 7 (very easy). After completing all measures for one topic, 
participants would then move on to the next topic.  
Results 
Descriptive analyses were conducted for each memory topic to assess participants’ 
attitudes associated with each topic, and the ease with which participants were able to recall and 
describe specific experiences related to the topics, and the degree to which participants assessed 
their own experiences as positive or negative experiences.  
Attitudes. The attitude scores for all memory topics are listed in Table 1. The topics that 
had mean ratings closest to the midpoint (4.00) were considered to be more evaluatively 
ambiguous or neutral topics, than were those that were closest to the scale endpoints. The most 
neutral topics were group work, social media, and multitasking. 
Table 1 
Attitude scores from pilot study on all memory topics.  
 Self-Attitudes Attitudes of a typical student Attitudes of a typical professor 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Group Work 3.42 1.49 3.30 1.63 2.10 0.96 
Social Media 3.26 1.13 2.17 0.96 4.63 1.21 
Multitasking 3.11 1.10 2.43 1.01 4.19 1.68 
Lying 6.08 1.00 5.87 1.05 6.75 0.43 
Bragging 5.79 0.95 5.66 1.25 5.81 1.18 
Procrastination 6.15 0.90 5.74 1.09 6.85 0.46 
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Experience Measures. The majority of participants reported having experiences related 
to group work (N = 86, 96.63%), multitasking (N = 88, 98.88%), bragging (N = 85, 95.51%), and 
procrastination (N = 88, 98.88%). All participants (N = 89, 100%) reported experiences with 
social media and lying. Additionally, all participants were able to list at least one positive and at 
least one negative consequence for all topics.  
Results on all topics for ease and valence of recall are presented in Table 2. Participants 
indicated that they could also easily bring to mind and describe in detail experiences related to 
group work, social media, and multitasking. Independent sample t-tests were conducted to 
examine whether scores on these topics were statistically above the scale midpoint. The ease at 
which participants could bring to mind a specific memory was significantly above the scale 
midpoint (4.00) for group work (M = 6.10, SD = 1.51), t(88) = 13.15, p < .001, social media (M 
= 6.75, SD = 0.59), t(88) = 44.07, p < .001, multitasking (M = 5.36, SD = 1.53), t(88) = 8.37, p < 
.001, lying (M = 4.85, SD = 1.89), t(88) = 4.27, p < .001, and procrastination (M = 6.25, SD = 
1.19) t(88) = 17.82, p < .001. The ease at which participants could bring to mind a specific 
memory was significantly below the scale midpoint for bragging (M = 3.56, SD = 1.93), t(88) = 
-2.14, p = .035. Similarly, the ease at which they reported being able to actually describe an 
experience related to the topic was statistically above the scale midpoint for group work (M = 
5.96, SD = 1.46), t(88) = 12.63, p < .001, social media (M = 6.31, SD = 1.10), t(88) = 19.79, p < 
.001, multitasking (M = 5.04, SD = 1.65), t(88) = 5.97, p < .001, lying (M = 4.52, SD = 2.06), 
t(88) = 2.36, p = .020, and procrastination (M = 6.00, SD = 1.33) t(88) = 14.17, p < .001, but 
was again, significantly below the scale midpoint for bragging (M = 3.53, SD = 1.94), t(88) = -
2.30, p = .024.  
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Overall, the pilot study provided information about participants’ attitudes and personal 
experiences related to each of the topics. To be consistent with previous studies on audience 
tuning (Echterhoff, Kopietz, Higgins, & Groll, 2008), we chose to include the topics that 
participants rated attitudes as being closest to the scale midpoint. Additionally, it was important 
to choose topics for which participants reported being able to easily think of related experiences, 
for which they reported being able to easily describe related experiences, and for which they 
were able to think of both positive and negative consequences. Therefore, the topics that were 










Descriptive results from pilot study on experience related measures for all memory topics. 
 Group work Social media Multitasking Lying Bragging Procrastination Range 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD  
Easily bring to mind 6.10 1.51 6.75 0.59 5.36 1.53 4.85 1.89 3.56 1.93 6.25 1.19 1 to 7 
Easily describe 5.96 1.46 6.31 1.10 5.04 1.65 4.52 2.06 3.53 1.94 6.00 1.33 1 to 7 
Positive experience 4.18 1.66 5.40 1.25 4.56 1.29 2.90 1.60 3.61 1.46 2.85 1.66 1 to 7 
Negative experience 4.16 1.62 3.35 1.67 3.84 1.28 5.26 1.47 3.99 1.43 5.34 1.39 1 to 7 
Ease of Positive 
Consequences 
4.99 1.61 5.54 1.23 4.04 1.59 2.92 1.69 2.86 1.46 2.72 1.75 1 to 7 
Ease of Negative 
Consequences 













CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENT 1 
Overview 
 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to examine the effects of audience perspective on memory 
descriptions and subsequent event memory perceptions, attitudes, and self-typicality. Experiment 
1 also examined how communicator’s perceptions of developing a shared reality with the 
audience is related to these outcomes.  
In this experiment, participants were asked to think of a previous life experience related 
to a specific topic and to write a description of this experience for the study researchers. After 
selecting their memory, but before writing the description, participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three audience conditions: 1) the study researchers were described as having a positive 
perspective of the memory topic (e.g., They believe that multi-tasking can be a positive and 
beneficial experience for undergraduate students.), 2) the study researchers were described as 
having a negative perspective of the memory topic (e.g., They believe that multi-tasking can be a 
negative and harmful experience for undergraduate students.), or 3) the perspective of the study 
researchers was not provided. After providing a written description of their experience, shared 
reality, event memory perceptions, attitudes toward the general topic, and self-typicality of the 
memory were assessed.  
Based on the audience tuning literature, it was expected that participants writing for an 
audience with a positive perspective would describe their memory more positively and recall the 
experience as being more positive and more typical of how they usually behave than participants 
writing for an audience with a negative perspective. Additionally, it was expected that 
participants writing for the audience with a positive perspective would have more positive 
attitudes about the memory topic than participants writing for the audience with a negative 
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perspective. Lastly, it was expected that perceptions of achieving a shared reality would be 
greater when the perspective of the audience is known than when the perspective of the audience 
is not known. Additional variables related to the characteristics of each participant’s memory 
(e.g., how long ago the memory occurred, importance of memory, emotional intensity of 
memory, etc.) were also measured along with measures assessing the degree to which 
participants thought about the audience while writing the memory, included details they thought 
the audience would like, and believed their essay would confirm the beliefs of the audience. 
Although there were no predictions related to these measures, they were included to examine 
whether memory characteristics and perceived audience influence may have differed by topic or 
audience condition. Experiment 1 was preregistered on open science framework 
(https://osf.io/xpv7d).  
Method 
Power Analysis and Participants 
 
To control for Type II error, or the probability of overlooking an existing effect, a power 
analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Previous 
research has reported a large effect size of audience perspective on memory perceptions, Cohen’s 
d = 1.2 (Todorov, 2002). A total sample size required to detect main effects in an Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) was calculated at an effect size of f = 0.40 and an observed power of 0.80. 
The power analysis revealed a necessary sample size of 64 participants. However, given the 
possibility of inflated effect sizes due to publication bias (Earp & Trafimow, 2015), a power 
analysis was also conducted using a more conservative effect size of f = 0.25 (Cohen’s d = 0.5), 
to detect main effects in an ANOVA, with an observed power of .80. The power analysis 
revealed a necessary sample size of 158 participants. We aimed to recruit 200 participants, in 
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order to allow for the removal of participants who fail the attention check, and data collection 
was terminated once all remaining participants who signed up were able to participate. 
Experiment 1 recruited 226 participants in total. However, forty-four participants were removed 
from all analyses due to failing the attention check. 
Participants were undergraduate students from Iowa State University enrolled in an 
introductory psychology or communication studies course. Participants received course credit for 
study participation. To be eligible for this study, participants were required to be at least 18 years 
of age. The average age of the final sample (N = 182) was 19.12 years old (SD = 1.60). The 
sample consisted of 138 women, 42 men, and one transgender individual. The majority of the 
sample identified as Caucasian (85.7%), (0.5% Native American, 5.5% African-American, 7.7% 
Latino/Hispanic, 6% Asian/Pacific Islander, 0.5% Indian, and 0.5% identified as Other). The 




Experiment 1 used a 3 (memory topic) x 3 (audience perspective) between-subjects 
factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to write about a memory related to one of 
three topics (multitasking, group work, or social media) and were also randomly assigned to one 
of three audience conditions: 1) audience with positive perspective, 2) audience with negative 
perspective, or 3) an audience for whom no information was given about their perspective on the 
topic. After writing a description of the memory, all participants then completed measures 
assessing shared reality, event memory perceptions, attitudes toward the topic, and self-typicality 






Participants completed all measures on a computer in the research laboratory. After 
consenting to participate in the study, participants were asked to think of a particular memory 
related to their assigned topic. They were asked to write four words related to the memory.  
Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three audience conditions which 
stated that the researchers in charge of the project had either a positive perspective, a negative 
perspective, or the researchers’ perspective on the topic was not provided. Next, participants 
completed the attention check asking about the audience’s perspective and then were asked to 
write a description of their memory to their assigned audience. 
After writing about the memory, participants then completed the shared reality measures 
followed by measures assessing the remaining dependent variables (i.e., self-typicality, event 
memory perceptions, attitudes related to their assigned topic, and the manipulation check) which 
were randomized in order. Please note that shared reality was not randomized because it was 
expected that people would become less accurate at recalling their experience of shared reality as 
the time between communication and recall increased. At the end of the experiment, participants 
completed measures assessing memory characteristics, perceived audience influence, and 
demographic information. They were then thanked for their participation and debriefed.  
Manipulations 
Positive audience prompt. In the positive audience condition, participants were given 
the following prompt: “The researchers in charge of this project are very interested in students’ 
experiences of [memory topic]. They believe that [memory topic] can be a positive and 
beneficial experience for undergraduate students and they encourage students to do it frequently 
to reap these rewards. They are eager to read your essay about a time when you engaged in 
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[memory topic] because they want to learn more about your experiences with this topic that they 
feel is beneficial for students. Take a few moments to think about your specific experience. In 
the space below, please write a thoughtful description of your experience.” 
Negative audience prompt. In the negative audience condition, participants were given 
the following prompt: “The researchers in charge of this project are very interested in students’ 
experiences of [memory topic]. They believe that [memory topic] can be a negative and harmful 
experience for undergraduate students and they encourage students not to do it frequently to 
avoid these negative consequences. They are eager to read your essay about a time when you 
engaged in [memory topic] because they want to learn more about your experiences with this 
topic that they feel is harmful for students. Take a few moments to think about your specific 
experience. In the space below, please write a thoughtful description of your experience.” 
No information prompt. In the no information condition participants were told: “The 
researchers in charge of this project are very interested in students’ experiences of [memory 
topic]. They are eager to read your essay about a time when you engaged in [memory topic] 
because they want to learn more about your experiences with this topic. Take a few moments to 
think about your specific experience. In the space below, please write a thoughtful description of 
your experience.” 
Attention Check. As an attention check, immediately after receiving the audience 
prompt participants were asked, “What is the researcher's opinion about the topic that you were 
assigned to write about?” Participants were asked to select among three options: a) The 
researcher has negative views about the topic, b) The researcher has positive views about the 
topic, or c) It was not mentioned. Participants who answered this question incorrectly were 
removed from analyses. Overall, 44 (19.47%) participants answered this question incorrectly. Of 
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those who answered incorrectly, 17 (38.64%) were in the positive audience condition, 17 
(38.64%) were in the negative audience condition, and 10 (22.73%) were in the no information 
audience condition. Failed attention checks did not differ by audience condition, χ2 (2, N = 226) 
= 2.91, p = .234. 
Manipulation Check. To examine whether the audience manipulation had the intended 
effects on perceptions of the researcher’s attitudes, participants were asked to rate their 
perceptions of researcher’s attitudes of the assigned topic among the following evaluative word 
pairs: positive/negative, like/dislike, good/bad, desirable/undesirable, beneficial/harmful, 
wise/foolish (Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994). For each word pair, participants rated their 
perceptions of the researchers view on the memory topic on a 7-point bipolar continuum with 
high scores indicating more positive attitudes.  
Measures 
 
Event Memory Perceptions. Event memory perceptions included the following four 
items: 1) How favorable would you rate yourself in this event?, 2) How likeable would you say 
you were in this event?, 3) How positive was this event?, and 4) How negative was this event?, 
with reverse-scoring on the final question. Participants responded to these items on a 7-point 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Items were averaged to create an overall event memory 
score, Cronbach’s α = .866. 
Attitude toward topic. Attitudes about the assigned memory topic were measured via 
six items using a semantic differential scale with endpoints of: positive/negative, like/dislike, 
good/bad, desirable/undesirable, beneficial/harmful, wise/foolish (Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 
1994). For each word pair, participants rated the memory topic on a 7-point bipolar continuum 
with high scores indicating more positive attitudes. The scores for each of the six word pairs 
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were averaged to create a total attitude score, Cronbach’s α = .899. 
Self-typicality. Memory self-typicality is the degree to which an individual perceives a 
memory to represent how he/she typically thinks and acts (Pasupathi & Rich, 2005). Participants 
reported the extent to which the talked‐about event is typical for them along three Likert‐scale 
items (“How typical is this event for how you usually are?”, “How consistent were your 
thoughts/reactions with how you usually think/react?”, “How consistent were your actions with 
how you usually think/react?”). Participants rated self-typicality of the event on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). These variables were averaged to create a total self-
typicality score, Cronbach’s α = .748.  
Shared Reality. Shared reality was measured with the shared reality scale recently 
established by Schmalback, Rossignac-Milon, Keller, Higgins, and Echterhoff (2019, February; 
for German scale validation see Schmalbach, Hennemuth & Echterhoff, 2019). The scale 
included 5 items assessing the degree to which people perceived a successful shared reality with 
the researchers about a particular target subject (Y); (“I feel the same way about Y as the 
researcher does”, “I think that the researcher and I are on the same wavelength with regard to Y”, 
“I agree with the researcher`s point of view of Y”, “The researcher and I see Y in the same way”, 
“I agree with the researcher`s perception of Y”). In this case, Y was replaced with 
“multitasking,”, “group work,” or “social media”. Participants answered the items on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items were averaged, Cronbach’s α = .963.  
Memory Characteristics. Participants answered questions relating to characteristics of 
their memory including how long ago the memory occurred, how important the memory was to 
the self, and the emotional intensity of the event. Participants also answered questions about how 
much they enjoyed writing about the memory, how easily the memory came to mind, and how 
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much they talked about the memory with others.  
Perceived Audience Influence. Participants answered questions about how much they 
thought about the audience while writing the memory, how much they included details they 
thought the audience would like, and how much they believed their essay would confirm the 
beliefs of the audience. Participants answered the items on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much). Items were averaged, Cronbach’s α = .565. 
Demographics. Participants were asked to provide information regarding their age, 
gender, ethnicity, first language learned, and language spoken at home.  
Essay Coding Procedures 
 
Essay Valence. All essays were coded both by using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (LIWC) software (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd & Francis, 2015) and also, by two 
independent coders. The LIWC software calculates the percentage of words that reflect positive 
emotion words (e.g., care, interesting, smile) and the percentage of words that reflect negative 
emotion words (e.g., bore, disturb, problem).  
Two coders blind to experimental conditions coded each essay for valence on eight 
dimensions. Coders rated the essays on essay positivity, essay negativity, end of essay positivity 
and end of essay negativity on a scale ranging from 0 = not at all to 2 = very much. Intercoder-
correlations were .68, .74, .76, and .83, respectively. The coders also rated each essay on overall 
valence of the essay and overall valence of the end of the essay on a scale ranging from -2 = very 
negative to 2 = very positive (rs = .76, .81). Lastly, the coders rated each essay for whether they 
mentioned positive or negative consequences as 0 = no or 1 = yes, (rs = .73, .77). Each essay was 
also coded for essay topic. All participants were found to have written about their assigned topic. 





The results from the manipulation check were examined first to ensure that the 
manipulation had the intended effect. Next, memory characteristics and audience measures were 
examined by both audience condition and by topic to determine whether essays differed across 
conditions. Descriptive analyses are also presented for all main dependent measures, followed by 
the main analyses for each outcome measure. A two-way univariate ANOVA was conducted for 
each dependent variable with audience condition and memory topic as between-subject factors. 
Lastly, exploratory moderation analyses are reported to examine whether shared reality 
moderated the effects of audience condition on the main dependent variables.  
Manipulation Check 
As a manipulation check, participants rated their perceptions of the researcher’s attitudes 
towards their assigned topic. A two-way ANOVA of audience perspective and memory topic on 
perceived researchers’ attitudes of the memory topic revealed the expected main effect of 
audience perspective, F(2, 179) = 373.59, p < .001, ηp
2 = .81, 95% CI [.76, .84]. Planned 
comparisons indicated that as expected, participants rated the researcher’s attitudes on the topics 
to be more positive in the positive audience condition (M = 6.47, SD = .63) than in both the 
negative audience condition (M = 1.80, SD = .92), p < .001, d = 5.91, 95% CI [5.04, 6.75] and 
the no information audience condition (M = 4.61, SD = 1.13), p < .001, d = 2.00, 95% CI [1.57, 
2.43]. Participants also rated the researchers’ attitudes more positively in the no information 
audience condition than in the negative audience condition, p < .001, d = 2.71, 95% CI [2.22, 
3.20]. These results suggest that the manipulation was successful in manipulating participants’ 




There was also a main effect of memory topic, F(2, 179) = 4.34, p = .014, ηp
2 = .05, 95% 
CI [.002, .11]. Planned comparisons indicated that participants rated the researchers’ attitudes on 
the memory topic to be more positive in the group work condition (M = 4.59, SD = 2.18) than in 
the multitasking (M = 4.14, SD = 2.15, p = .006, d = 0.21, 95% CI [-.15, .57]) and social media 
conditions (M = 4.22, SD = 1.96, .026, d = 0.18, 95% CI [-.18, .54]). The difference between 
multitasking and social media conditions was not statistically significant, p = .595, d = 0.04, 95% 
CI [-.31, .39]. Lastly, the interaction of audience perspective and memory topic was not 
statistically significant, F(4, 173) = 2.38, p = .054, ηp
2 = .052, 95% CI [.00, .10]. 
Memory Characteristics and Perceived Audience Influence 
There were no effects of audience condition on any of the measured memory 
characteristics (i.e., word count, time since the event occurred, importance of memory, emotional 
intensity of memory, enjoyment experienced when writing about the memory, ease of recall, or 
frequency of event disclosure), see Table 3. However, there were effects of memory topic on 3 of 
the characteristics: time since the event occurred, importance of memory, and frequency of event 
disclosure.  
Post hoc comparisons indicated that participants reported multitasking memories (M = 
1.41, SD = 0.89) as having occurred more recently than group work memories (M = 2.09, SD = 
0.99), p = .001, d = 0.72, 95% CI [0.36, 1.09]) and social media memories (M = 1.98, SD = 
1.41), p = .005, d = 0.48, 95% CI [0.16, 0.83]). There was no difference of time since event 
between group work and social media memories, p = .611, d = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.45]. 





work memories (M = 3.09, SD = 1.81), p = .005, d = 0.50, 95% CI [0.16, 0.86] and multitasking  
memories (M = 2.54, SD = 1.62), p < .001, d = 0.83, 95% CI [0.46, 1.19]. Lastly, participants 
reported having previously disclosed social media memories (M = 4.21, SD = 1.83) more often 
than group work memories (M = 3.02, SD = 2.01), p = .001, d = 0.62, 95% CI [0.25, 0.99] and 
multitasking memories (M = 2.37, SD = 1.77), p < .001, d = 1.02, 95% CI [0.65, 1.39]. The 
difference between frequency of event disclosure between group work memories and 
multitasking memories was not statistically significant, p = .055, d = 0.34, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.71].  
Additionally, there were no main effects of audience condition or memory topic on the 
degree to which participants reported thinking about their audience, including details for their 
audience, and believing their essay would confirm the perspective of the audience, which were 
averaged for a total score. However, there was an interaction effect of audience condition and 
topic such that there was no effect of memory topic in the negative audience condition, p = .168, 
ηp
2 = .020, 95% CI [.000, .071], or in the no information audience condition, p = .872, ηp
2 = .002, 
95% CI [.000, .020], but there was an effect of topic in the positive audience condition, p = .006, 
ηp
2 = .057, 95% CI [.005, .129] with participants writing about group work indicating more 
perceived audience influence (M = 4.69, SD = 1.18) than participants writing about multitasking 
(M = 3.51, SD = 1.38), p = .008, d = 0.92, 95% CI [0.23, 1.59], or social media (M = 3.73, SD = 







Table 3  
Experiment 1 Means of Memory Characteristics and Audience Measures across Topics and Audience Conditions  








































4.53 4.61 4.57 3.83 3.82 4.45 4.08 3.45 4.15 .032 .012 .012 








3.51 4.69 3.73 4.54 3.81 4.05 4.04 4.20 4.03 .003 .011 .067* 
Note. Results are based on two-way ANOVAs. *p < .05, **p < .01. Time since event occurred was measured on a scale from 1 (less than 1 
month ago) to 7 (more than 10 years ago). Importance of memory, emotional intensity, enjoyment, and ease of recall were all measured on a 
scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Frequency of disclosure was measured on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (more than most 
events that have happened to me). 
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Descriptive results for main dependent variables. Descriptive statistics for all 
dependent variables are provided in Table 4. Additionally, a correlational analysis was conducted 
to examine the relationships among dependent variables and is provided in Table 5. As 
illustrated in the table, attitude toward topic, event memory perceptions, self-typicality, and essay 
valence were all positively associated with one another. Shared reality was positively associated 
with attitude toward topic, but there was no significant association between shared reality and the 
other variables. 
Table 4 
Descriptives for Experiment 1 Outcome Variables 
 N M SD Range 
Shared reality 182 4.43 1.32 1 to 7 
Attitude toward topic 182 4.38 1.28 1 to 7 
Event memory perceptions 182 4.05 1.32 1 to 6 
Self typicality 182 5.19 1.15 1 to 7 
Essay valence 182 -0.06 1.09 -2 to 2 
 
Table 5  
Correlations among Experiment 1 Outcome Variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Shared reality -     
2. Attitude toward topic     .20** -    
3. Event memory perceptions .11 .56** -   
4. Self typicality .07 .16* .26** -  
5. Essay valence -.07 .34** .66** .17* - 




Shared Reality. According to shared reality theory which indicates that knowledge about 
the audience’s attitude is necessary for shared reality to occur (Echterhoff, Higgins & Levine, 
2009), it was predicted that participants in the no information condition would report achieving 
less of a shared reality than participants in both the positive and negative audience conditions. A 
two-way ANOVA of audience perspective and topic on shared reality revealed a marginal effect 
of audience on perceptions of shared reality, F(2, 173) = 2.98, p = .053, ηp
2 = .033, 95% CI [.00, 
.09]. As expected, participants in the positive audience condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.59) reported 
greater shared reality than participants in the no information audience (M = 4.25, SD = 0.65), p = 
.026, d = 0.42, 95% CI [.07, .78], but was not statistically different from those in the negative 
audience condition (M = 4.33, SD = 1.54), p = .070, d = 0.27, 95% CI [-.10, .63]. Contrary to 
expectations, there was no difference between the negative audience condition and the no 
information audience condition, p = .710, d = 0.07, 95% CI [-.28, .42]. The inconsistency of 
these results suggest that participants might make assumptions about the audience’s attitudes, 
even when they are not directly informed about their perspective. These results are displayed in 
Figure 1. 
There was no main effect of memory topic on perceptions of shared reality, F(2, 173) = 
0.96, p = .384, ηp
2 = .011, 95% CI [.00, .05]. However, there was an unexpected interaction 
effect of audience and memory topic on shared reality, F(4, 173) = 5.93, p < .001, ηp
2 = .120, 
95% CI [.03, .20]. The interaction between audience condition and memory topic suggests that 
there was a significant effect of topic within the positive audience condition, F(2, 173) = 5.65, p 
= .004, ηp
2 = .061, 95% CI [.01, .13] and the negative audience condition, F(2, 173) = 6.45, p = 
.002, ηp
2 = .069, 95% CI [.01, .15], but topic was not significant in the no information audience 
condition, F(2, 173) = 0.73, p = .482, ηp
2 = .008, 95% CI [.00, .05]. Although unexpected, the 
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interaction effects suggest that the degree to which individuals experience a shared reality is 




Figure 1. Experiment 1: Effects of audience perspective and memory topic on shared 
reality.  
Attitude toward topic. It was predicted that participants in the positive audience 
condition would report more positive attitudes about the memory topic than participants in the 
negative audience condition. A two-way ANOVA revealed that there was a main effect of 
audience perspective on attitudes of the memory topic, F(2, 173) = 8.92, p < .001, ηp
2 = .093, 
95% CI [.02, .18]. Participants in the positive audience condition reported more positive attitudes 



















Supportive Critical No Information
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condition (M = 3.93, SD = 1.28), p < .001, d = 0.64, 95% CI [.27, 1.01], and participants in the  
negative audience condition reported more negative attitudes than participants in the no 
information audience condition (M = 4.44, SD = 1.07), p = .015, d = 0.44, 95% CI [.08, .80]. 
There difference between participants in the positive audience condition and participants in the 
no information audience condition was not statistically significant, p = .116, d = 0.28, 95% CI [-
.08, .63].  
There was also a main effect of memory topic on subsequent attitudes of the memory 
topics, F(2, 173) = 7.19, p = .001, ηp
2 = .077, 95% CI [.01, .15]. Participants in the multitasking 
condition reported less positive attitudes (M = 3.97, SD = 1.47) than both participants in the 
social media condition (M = 4.64, SD = 0.93), p = .002, d = 0.54, 95% CI [0.18, 0.90] and 
participants in the group work condition (M = 4.56, SD = 1.29, p = .008, d = 0.42, 95% CI [.06, 
.78]. The difference between participants in the social media condition and participants in the 
group work condition was not statistically significant, p = .698, d = 0.07, 95% CI [-.29, .44]. 
Lastly, there was a significant interaction between audience and memory topic on subsequent 
attitudes, F(2, 173) = 3.27, p = .013, ηp
2 = .070, 95% CI [.003, .13]. Audience perspective had a 
significant effect on attitudes for participants in the multitasking, F(2, 173) = 8.51, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .090, 95%CI [.02, .17] and group work, F (2, 173) = 6.13, p = .003, ηp
2 = .066, 95% CI [.01, 
.14] conditions, but the effect of audience for participants in the social media condition was not 
statistically significant, F(2, 173) = 0.34, p = .967, ηp
2 = .000, 95% CI [.000, .003]. This 




Figure 2. Experiment 1: Effects of audience perspective and memory topic on subsequent 
attitudes of the memory topic. 
Event Memory Perceptions. It was predicted that participants in the positive audience 
condition would report more positive event memory perceptions than participants in the negative 
audience condition. As hypothesized, a two-way ANOVA of audience perspective and topic on 
event memory perceptions revealed a main effect of audience perspective, F(2, 173) = 4.04, p = 
.019, ηp
2 = .045, 95% CI [.001, .111]. Participants in the positive audience condition (M = 4.41, 
SD = 1.24) reported their memories as being more positive than did participants in the negative 
audience condition (M = 3.83, SD = 1.38), p = .014, d = 0.44, 95% CI [.07, .81], and participants 
in the no information audience condition (M = 3.94, SD = 1.28), p = .040, d = 0.37, 95% CI [.19, 
.56].The difference between participants in the negative audience condition and participants in 
the no information audience condition was not significantly different, p = .634, d = 0.08, 95% CI 
[.04, .12]. 
 There was also an unexpected main effect of memory topic on self-reported memory 
valence, F(2, 173) = 3.73, p = .026, ηp
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audience perspective and memory topic on self-reported memory valence, F(4, 173) = 2.85, p = 
.025, ηp
2 = .062, 95% CI [.00, .12]. Participants who wrote about group work rated their 
memories as more positive (M = 4.38, SD = 1.04) than participants who wrote about multitasking 
(M = 3.79, SD = 1.29), p = .012, d = 0.50, 95% CI [.13, .86]. However, the difference was not 
significantly different between participants who wrote about group work and participants who 
wrote about social media (M = 4.02, SD = 1.50), p = .118, d = 0.28, 95% CI [-.08, .64] or 
between participants who wrote about multitasking and participants who wrote about social 
media, p = .323, d = 0.16, 95% CI [-.19, .51].  
Additionally, the interaction between audience perspective and topic indicates that there 
was the predicted difference of memory valence between participants in the positive audience 
condition and the negative audience condition for both multitasking memories, p = .005, d = 
1.00, 95% CI [.30, 1.68] and group work memories, p = .011, d = 0.90, 95% CI [.21, 1.58]; 
however, the difference was not statistically significant for participants writing about their social 
media memories, p = .718, d = 0.11, 95% CI [-.49, .71]. These results are presented in Figure 3. 
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memory perceptions. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
Self-typicality. It was predicted that participants in the positive audience condition would 
perceive their memories to be more self-typical than participants in the negative audience 
condition. However, a two-way ANOVA revealed that there was no main effect of audience on 
self-typicality, F(2, 173) = 2.10, p = .126, ηp
2 = .024, 95% CI [.00, .08], neither was there a main 
effect of memory topic on self-typicality, F(2, 173) = 0.55, p = .581, ηp
2 = .006, 95% CI [.00, 
.04]. Participants in the positive audience condition (M = 5.41, SD = 1.13) reported their 
memories as slightly more self-typical than participants in the no information audience condition 
(M = 5.01, SD = 1.23), p = .052, d = 0.34, 95% CI [-.02, .69] but there was no difference 
between the positive audience condition and the negative audience condition (M = 5.18, SD = 
1.05), p = .271, d = 0.22, 95% CI [-.15, .58], or between the negative audience condition and the 
no information audience condition, p = .417, d = 0.15, 95% CI [-.21, .50]. These results are 
presented in Figure 4. There was no interaction between audience and memory topic, F(2, 173) = 
0.80, p = .528, ηp
2 = .01, 95% CI [.00, .01].  
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Essay Valence. It was predicted that participants in the positive audience condition 
would include more positive emotion words and fewer negative emotion words, as calculated 
using the LIWC software, than participants in the negative audience condition. A two-way 
ANOVA revealed a non-significant effect of audience on the inclusion of positive emotion 
words in the essays, F(2, 167) = 0.18, p = .835, ηp
2 = .002, 95% CI [.00, .02]. However, results 
indicated that there was a significant effect of topic on positive emotion words, F(2, 167) = 6.98, 
p = .001, ηp
2 = .077, 95% CI [.01, .16], such that memories about social media (M = 3.38, SD = 
2.33) included more positive emotion words than both memories about multitasking (M = 2.14, 
SD = 1.48), p < .001, d = 0.63, 95% CI [.27, 1.00] and memories about group work (M = 2.73, 
SD = 1.43), p < .001, d = 0.34, 95% CI [-.03, .70]. There was no difference in positive emotion 
words between memories about multitasking and memories about group work, p = .089, d = 
0.40, 95% CI [.03, .77]. Furthermore, there was no interaction between audience and topic on 
positive emotion words, F(4, 167) = 0.44, p = .778, ηp
2 = .010, 95% CI [.00, .03]. These results 
are presented in Figure 5. 
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positive emotion words in memory essay.  
Next, a two-way ANOVA revealed no effect of audience on the inclusion of negative 
emotion words in essays, F(2, 167) = 0.12, p = .883, ηp
2 = .001, 95% CI [.00, .02]. However, 
results indicated an effect of memory topic, F(2, 167) = 3.89, p = .022, ηp
2 = .04, 95% CI [.00, 
.11]. Again, participants in the social media condition (M = 1.38, SD = 1.32) included more 
negative emotion words than participants in the multitasking (M = 0.90, SD = 0.94), p = .015, d = 
0.42, 95% CI [.06, .78] and group work conditions (M = 0.90, SD = 0.86), p = .018, d = 0.43, 
95% CI [.05, .80]. There was no difference in negative emotion words between memories about 
multitasking and memories about group work, p = .996, d = .001, 95% CI [-.05, .05]. There was 
no interaction between audience and memory topic, F(4, 173) = 0.66, p = .622, ηp
2 = .016, 95% 
CI [.00, .05]. These results are presented in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Experiment 1: Effects of Audience perspective and memory topic on inclusion 
of negative emotion words in memory essay.  
Essay valence was also assessed using ratings from two independent coders. Essays were  
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dimension, only results for overall essay valence are reported here. See Appendix A for 
additional analyses and the correlation matrix for all coded variables. Contrary to expectations, 
results did not indicate a statistically significant effect of audience condition on essay valence, 
F(2, 173) = 0.84, p = .433, ηp
2 = .010, 95% CI [.00, .08] nor an effect of topic on essay valence, 
F(2, 173) = 2.97, p = .054, ηp
2 = .033, 95% CI [.00, .10]. The interaction effect of audience and 
topic was not statistically significant, F(4, 173) = 0.45, p = .772, ηp
2 = .010, 95% CI [.00, .03]. 
Taken together, these results indicate no apparent audience tuning as measured via valence 
coding of written essays. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 
It was surprising that participants did not tune their memories to be more aligned with the 
perspective of their audience, yet audience perspective still resulted in biased perceptions of the 
memory. Previous research would suggest the tuning leads to the audience-bias effect, however, 
it is possible that autobiographical memories are not as susceptible to tuning as is communication 
about others’ behavior. It is possible that the audience-bias effect may instead depend on the 
degree to which communicators achieve a shared reality with their audience (Echterhoff et al., 
2008). Thus, I examined whether the degree to which participants perceived shared reality with 
the audience would moderate the effects of audience perspective on subsequent attitudes and 
event memory perceptions.  
Exploratory analyses were conducted to determine whether the observed relationship 
between audience perspective and participant a) post-essay attitudes and b) post-essay memory 
perceptions would be more pronounced for those individuals who reported achieving greater 
shared reality with the audience as compared to those who reported achieving less shared reality 
with the audience. I used Model 1 of Hayes’ (2017) PROCESS macro to examine these effects. 
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Moderation of Shared Reality on Attitudes. If shared reality contributes to the 
audience-bias effect, it would be expected that participants who reported greater shared reality 
would demonstrate more pronounced effects, such that those in the positive audience condition 
would report more positive memory attitudes and those in the negative audience condition would 
report more negative memory attitudes, as compared to participants who reported less shared 
reality. Since the independent variable is categorical and has more than two categories, audience 
condition was dummy coded using zeroes and ones (see Table 6 for dummy coded variables).  
The positive audience condition was chosen as the reference group in order to compare 1) 
the difference between the positive and negative audience conditions and 2) the difference 
between the positive and no information audience conditions. Therefore, the first dummy coded 
variable (Positive Audience vs. Negative Audience) shows the difference on memory attitudes 
between participants in the positive audience condition and participants in the negative audience 
condition. The beta value describes the change in attitudes due to a unit increase in the predictor, 
which represents a change from the positive audience condition (coded as 0) to the negative 
audience condition (coded as 1). The interaction of the first dummy coded variable (Positive 
Audience vs. Negative Audience) by shared reality represents the change in attitudes between the 
positive audience condition and the negative audience condition as a function of shared reality. 
Results revealed a significant interaction between the negative audience condition and 
shared reality, b = .-1.36, t(176) = -13.45, p < .001, suggesting that shared reality does moderate 
the effects of audience on attitudes between participants in the positive and negative audience 
conditions. To interpret the moderation effect, conditional effects were calculated at one standard 
deviation above and below the mean of shared reality. Conditional effects at one standard 




Dummy Coding for Moderation Analyses 
Audience Condition Dummy coded variable 1 
(Positive vs. Negative Audience) 
Dummy coded variable 2 (Positive 
vs. No Information Audience) 
Positive Audience 0 0 
Negative Audience 1 0 
No Information Audience 0 1 
 
attitudes at higher levels of shared reality, b = -2.46, t(176) = -12.29, p < .001, with participants 
reporting more negative attitudes in the negative audience condition than participants in the 
positive audience condition. Additionally, conditional effects at one standard deviation below the 
mean of shared reality indicated a significant effect in the opposite direction, b = 1.12, t(176) = 
5.26, p < .001, such that participants reported more positive attitudes in the negative audience 
condition than in the positive audience condition.  
The second dummy coded variable (Positive Audience vs. No Information Audience) 
represents the difference of memory attitudes between participants in the positive audience 
condition and participants in the no information condition. The beta value describes the change 
in attitudes due to a unit increase in the predictor, which is a change from the positive audience 
condition (coded as 0) to the no information condition (coded as 1). Therefore, the interaction of 
the second dummy coded variable (Positive Audience vs. No Information Audience) by shared 
reality represents the change in attitudes between the positive audience condition and the no 
information condition as a function of shared reality. The interaction between the no information 
audience condition and shared reality was non-significant, b = .04, t(176) = 0.21, p = .830, 
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suggesting that the difference in attitudes between participants in the positive audience condition 
and the no information condition is not moderated by shared reality. The overall interaction of 
audience condition and shared reality resulted in a significant increase in variance explained as 
compared to a model with only main effects, R2 = .47, F(2, 176) = 98.96, p < .001. These 
results are reported in Table 7 and displayed in Figure 7. 
Given the unpredicted effects of memory topic on memory attitudes reported above, 
additional analyses were conducted to explore if the moderation of shared reality on attitudes 
differed by memory topic. I used Model 3 of Hayes’ (2017) PROCESS macro to examine these 
effects. For this model, audience condition and memory topic were both dummy coded and 
shared reality was mean-centered. Results revealed that the moderation of shared reality on the 
effect of audience perspective on attitudes did not significantly differ my memory topic, R2 = 
.02, F(4, 164) = 1.81, p = .130.  
Table 7 
Regression analysis of shared reality and audience on attitudes 
 b 
95% CI 
SE T P 
Constant 4.53 
[4.31, 4.76] 
.11 40.22 <.001 
Negative Audience -0.67 
[-0.98, -0.36] 
.16 -4.23 <.001 
No Information Aud. 0.06 
[-0.25, 0.37] 
.16 0.38 .701 
Shared Reality (centered) 0.77 
[0.63, 0.91] 
.07 10.95 <.001 
Negative Aud. x SR -1.36 
[-1.56, -1.16] 
.10 -13.45 <.001 
No Information x SR .04 
[-.31, 0.38] 
.18 0.21 .830 





Figure 7. Interaction of Shared Reality and Audience on Attitudes 
Moderation of Shared Reality and Audience on Event Memory Perceptions. If 
shared reality contributes to the audience-biasing effect, it would be expected that participants 
who reported greater shared reality would demonstrate more pronounced effects such that those 
in the positive audience condition would report more positive event memory perceptions and 
those in the negative audience condition would report more negative event memory perceptions 
as compared to participants who reported less shared reality. Audience condition was again 
dummy coded and the positive audience condition was chosen as the reference group. Therefore, 
the first dummy coded variable (Positive Audience vs. Negative Audience) shows the difference 
between event memory perceptions between participants in the positive audience condition and 
participants in the negative audience condition. The beta value describes the change in event 
memory perceptions due to a unit increase in the predictor, which is a change from the positive 
audience condition (coded as 0) to the negative audience condition (coded as 1). The interaction 
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represents the change in event memory perceptions between the positive audience condition and 
the negative audience condition as a function of shared reality. 
 Results revealed a significant interaction between the negative audience condition and 
shared reality, b = -.98, t(176) = -7.16, p < .001, indicating that shared reality does moderate the 
effects of audience on event memory perceptions between participants in the positive and 
negative audience conditions. To interpret the moderation effect, conditional effects were 
calculated at one standard deviation above and below the mean of shared reality. Conditional 
effects at one standard deviation above the mean indicated the expected effect of audience 
condition at higher levels of shared reality, b = -1.75, t(176) = -6.47, p < .001, with participants 
reporting more negative memories in the negative audience condition compared to the positive 
audience condition. Additionally, conditional effects calculated at one standard deviation below 
the mean of shared reality indicated a significant effect in the opposite direction, b = .82, t(176) 
= 2.86, p = .005, such that participants reported more positive memories in the negative audience 
condition compared to the positive audience condition.  
The second dummy coded variable (Positive Audience vs. No Information Audience) 
shows the difference between event memory perceptions between participants in the positive 
audience condition and participants in the no information condition. The beta value describes the 
change in event memory perceptions due to a unit increase in the predictor, which is a change 
from the positive audience condition (coded as 0) to the no information condition (coded as 1). 
The interaction between the no information condition and shared reality was non-significant, b = 
.01, t(176) = 0.03, p = .973, suggesting that the effect of audience condition on event memory 
conditions is not moderated by shared reality for participants in the no information condition 
compared to participants in the positive audience condition. The overall interaction of audience 
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condition and shared reality resulted in a significant increase in variance explained as compared 
to the model with only main effects, R2 = .23, F(2, 176) = 27.85, p < .001. These results are 
reported in Table 8 and displayed in Figure 8. 
Additional analyses were again conducted to explore if the moderation of shared reality 
on event memory perceptions differed by memory topic. I used Model 3 of Hayes’ (2017) 
PROCESS macro to examine these effects. For this model, audience condition and memory topic 
were both dummy coded and shared reality was mean-centered. Results revealed that the 
moderation of shared reality on the effect of audience perspective on event memory perceptions 
did not significantly differ by memory topic, R2 = .01, F(4, 164) = 0.43, p = .787.  
Table 8 
Regression analysis of shared reality and audience on event memory perceptions 
 b 
95% CI 
SE T P 
Constant 4.24 
[3.94, 4.54] 
0.15 27.83 <.001 
Negative Audience -0.46 
[-0.88, -0.04] 
0.21 -2.17 .032 
No Information Audience -0.21 
[-0.63, 0.21] 
0.21 -0.99 .322 
Shared Reality (centered) 0.51 
[0.33, 0.70] 
0.10 5.41 <.001 
Negative Audience x SR -0.98 
[-1.25, -0.71] 
0.14 -7.16 <.001 
No Information x SR 0.01 
[-0.46, 0.48] 
0.24 0.03 .973 





Figure 8. Interaction of Shared Reality and Audience on Event Memory Perceptions 
 
Experiment 1 Discussion 
Experiment 1 endeavored to examine how elaborating on a life experience to an audience 
may influence subsequent perceptions about the memory, attitudes about the memory topic, and 
self-typicality. It was hypothesized that after elaborating on a memory to an audience with a 
positive perspective on the topic, participants would view the memory more positively, have 
more positive attitudes about the memory topic, and view the memory as more typical of the self 
than after elaborating on a memory to an audience with a negative perspective on the topic. It 
was also hypothesized that participants would describe their memory more positively for the 
audience with a positive perspective on the topic and more negatively for the audience with a 
negative perspective to create a shared reality with the audience.  
The results partially supported these hypotheses. When averaged across all memory 
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to have more positive perceptions of the memory and more positive attitudes about the memory 
topic themselves than elaborating about a memory to an audience who held a negative 
perspective, consistent with my predictions. However, results indicated an unexpected 
interaction of audience perspective and memory topic in which the effects of audience 
perspective on memory valence and attitudes were not consistent across all memory topics. In 
particular, the audience-bias effect was not observed among participants who elaborated on an 
experience related to social media. Although the pilot study found that undergraduate research 
participants have evaluatively similar attitudes toward social media, group work, and multi-
tasking, results from the present study indicated that recalled events involving social media 
differed from the other topics on a number of dimensions including importance of the memory, 
frequency of disclosure, and emotionality of the written essay. It is possible, then, that the 
audience-biasing effect has an unpredicted moderator, such as memory emotionality or 
importance of the memory. Future work should examine these possibilities. Additionally, the 
hypotheses for self-typicality were not supported such that audience perspective did not 
influence subsequent perceptions of self-typicality.  
It was surprising that audience perspective did not bias self-typicality of the memories. 
However, there are several possibilities for why this may have occurred. Previous literature has 
shown that people tend to be self-enhancing by viewing positive events as highly typical of the 
self (Greenwald, 1980; Pasupathi & Rich, 2005) and maintain optimism and high self-esteem by 
viewing negative memories as more atypical (Libby & Eibach, 2002). However, the current 
study included memories that were intentionally non-emotional. Therefore, it is possible that 
these memories were not perceived as either self-enhancing enough or threatening enough to 
influence perceptions of the self-concept. Future studies should explore this further by 
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investigating the audience-biasing effect in relation to memories that are more emotional in 
nature.  
It was also predicted that participants would describe their memories in a manner that is 
aligned with the perspective of their audience in order to create a shared reality. However, there 
was no overall effect of audience perspective on the positivity or negativity of the memory 
descriptions. Previous studies have measured tuning by comparing post-audience manipulation 
descriptions to the original ambiguous message. However, this is not possible with the current 
paradigm and it is likely that participants’ original memories varied in the degree of positivity 
and negativity at the start of the study. Therefore, the current project cannot assess the degree to 
which the memory description has been tuned according to the original memory. Conversely, 
these results may suggest that elaboration of the memory is not driving the audience-bias effect 
as previous research would suggest that it should (Echterhoff, et al., 2013). Experiment 2 will 
examine the role of elaboration more closely to determine whether message production is 
necessary for the audience-biasing effect to occur, despite the lack of evidence for tuning.  
Relatedly, the effects of audience perspective on perceptions of a shared reality were not 
consistent with predictions that participants who learned the perspective of their audience would 
achieve greater shared reality than those who did not receive information about audience 
perspective. It is possible that participants assumed a shared reality with their audience even 
when explicit information about audience perspective was not received. Regardless, exploratory 
analyses revealed that shared reality is an important component of the audience-biasing effect. 
Results indicated that participants who experienced a shared reality with the audience had more 
positive event memory perceptions and attitudes after elaborating on the memory for the positive 
audience and had more negative event memory perceptions and attitudes after elaborating on the 
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memory for the negative audience than did participants who did not experience a shared reality. 
Taken together, these results suggest that when people perceive a shared reality with their 
audience, communication with that audience may be more likely to result in biased perceptions 
that are aligned with their audience’s perspective. These results are consistent with previous 
literature suggesting that the audience biasing effect depends on the goals driving 
communication (Echterhoff et al., 2008). Shared reality has been found to contribute to this 




CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT 2 
Study Overview 
 
Experiment 2 was designed to examine the underlying mechanism through which the 
audience-bias effect occurs. Research on audience tuning typically entails two distinct stages: 1) 
speaker is made aware of the audience’s perspective, and 2) message is elaborated in a manner 
consistent with that perspective. It is often assumed that the audience’s effect on the speaker’s 
perceptions is driven by the speaker’s elaboration of events (Echterhoff et al., 2013). In fact, the 
saying-is-believing effect has been shown to disappear when participants do not actually produce 
the message for their anticipated audience (Higgins & Rholes, 1978). However, other research 
has suggested that mere knowledge about the attitude of an anticipated audience can affect what 
participants remember about an ambiguous stimulus (Schramm & Danielson, 1958; Zimmerman 
& Bauer, 1956). Similarly, research on response bias and demand characteristics finds that 
individuals regularly provide responses to be consistent with what they believe their audience 
expects or desires (Furnham, 1986). Thus, Experiment 2 aimed to untangle these two elements to 
better understand whether elaboration regarding one’s life events for the audience is necessary or 
whether mere knowledge of another’s perspective is sufficient to alter one’s perceptions of a past 
experience. 
For Experiment 2, participants were asked to think of a specific memory related to either 
multitasking or group work. The social media condition was removed from Experiment 2 given 
the unexpected differences in reported memory characteristics for social media memory 
descriptions, as compared to memory descriptions related to group work or multitasking. After 
thinking of a specific memory, participants were then randomly assigned to one of the same 
audience conditions used in Experiment 1. Participants then either wrote about their memory as 
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in Experiment 1, or, they were not asked to write about their memory before answering questions 
assessing the same dependent measures from Experiment 1.  
Replicating Experiment 1, it was predicted that for those who elaborate on their memory, 
participants writing for an audience with a positive perspective would recall the experience as 
being more positive and would demonstrate more positive attitudes about the memory topic than 
participants writing for an audience with a negative perspective. It was also predicted that 
participants writing for an audience with a positive perspective would describe their memories 
more positively and would rate them as more typical than participants writing for an audience 
with a negative perspective. However, given that the predictions for memory descriptions and 
self-typicality were not supported in Experiment 1, it was expected that the original predictions 
for these would again not be supported. Additionally, if elaboration is a necessary component of 
the audience-bias effect, then there should be a significant interaction of audience perspective 
and elaboration such that when elaboration via writing occurs, audience perspective leads to 
corresponding perceptions of the memory and attitudes. However, when elaboration does not 
occur, audience perspective should have a weaker effect on subsequent perceptions related to the 
memory and attitudes. If elaboration is not a necessary component of the audience-bias effect, 
then audience perspective should have similar effects across both, the elaboration and no 
elaboration conditions.  
It was also originally predicted that within the elaboration condition, shared reality would 
mediate the effects of audience perspective on subsequent attitudes and memory perceptions. 
However, given the lack of a causal relationship of audience perspective on shared reality in 
Experiment 1, moderation analyses were conducted instead in an attempt to replicate the findings 
from Experiment 1. Therefore, it was expected that within the elaboration condition, participants 
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who report greater shared reality would demonstrate more pronounced audience-bias effects such 
that those in the positive audience condition would report more positive event memory 
perceptions and attitudes than those in the negative audience condition. As in Experiment 1, 
additional variables related to the characteristics of each participant’s memory (e.g., how long 
ago the memory occurred, importance of memory, emotional intensity of memory, etc.) were 
also measured along with measures assessing the degree to which participants thought about the 
audience while writing the memory, included details they thought the audience would like, and 
believed their essay would confirm the beliefs of the audience. Although there were no 
predictions related to these measures, they were included to examine whether memory 
characteristics and audience influence may have differed by topic or audience condition. 
Experiment 2 was preregistered on open science framework (https://osf.io/dz9xj).  
Method 
Power Analysis and Participants 
 
A power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007). Previous research on audience tuning suggests that there should be a large effect size of 
message elaboration on memory perceptions, (d = 2.11), and a medium sized interaction of 
elaboration and audience perspective on memory perceptions, (η2 = 0.11), (Higgins, Echterhoff, 
Crespillo, & Kopietz, 2007). Therefore, a power analysis was conducted assuming a medium 
effect size (f = 0.25). The power analysis revealed a necessary sample size needed for an 
ANOVA to obtain a power of .80 is 158 participants to test for main effects and interactions. 
However, given the possibility of inflated effect sizes due to publication bias (Earp & Trafimow, 
2015), a power analysis was also conducted using a more conservative effect size of f = 0.20, 
which revealed a necessary sample size of 245 participants. We aimed to recruit 300 participants 
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to allow for the removal of participants who fail the attention check and stopped data collection 
once all remaining participants who signed up were able to participate. A total of 327 
participants were recruited for Experiment 2. Twenty-nine participants were removed from all 
analyses for failing the attention check. 
Participants were undergraduate students from Iowa State University who were enrolled 
in introductory psychology or communication studies courses and received course credit for 
study participation. To be eligible for this study, participants were required to be at least 18 years 
of age. The average age of the remaining sample (N = 298) was 19.04 (SD = 1.39). The sample 
consisted of 184 women, 113 men, and one person who identified as non-binary. The majority of 
the sample (81.2%) identified as Caucasian (1.7% Native American, 5.7% African-American, 
6.4% Latino/Hispanic, 6.4% Asian/Pacific Islander, 1.0% Indian, and 2.0% Other). The majority 
of participants (92.9%) of participants also reported English as being their primary language 
spoken at home.  
Study Design  
 
In Experiment 2, a 3 (audience perspective: positive, negative, or unmentioned) x 2 
(memory elaboration: written description of memory or no written description of memory) x 2 
(memory topic: multitasking or group work) between-subjects factorial design was conducted. 
Similar to Experiment 1, participants were first randomly assigned to think of a specific memory 
related to one of two topics (multitasking or group work) and then, were randomly assigned to 
one of three audience conditions: 1) a positive audience 2) a negative audience or 3) an audience 
for whom no information was given about their perspective on the topic. Next, participants were 
then assigned to either: 1) elaborate on their memory by writing about it to their assigned 
audience or 2) to not elaborate on their memory. All participants then completed measures 
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assessing shared reality followed by measures assessing attitudes, event memory perceptions, 
and self-typicality, which were randomized in order. Lastly, participants completed measures 
related to memory characteristics, perceived audience influence, and demographics before being 
thanked and debriefed.  
Procedure 
 
Procedures for Experiment 2 were similar to Experiment 1. Participants completed all 
measures on a computer in the research laboratory. After consenting to participate in the study, 
participants were asked to think of a particular memory related to either multitasking or group 
work. They were then asked to write down four words related to the memory. Next, participants 
were randomly assigned to read one of the three audience prompts which stated that the 
researchers of the project had either a positive perspective on the memory topic, a negative 
perspective on the memory topic, or which did not give any information about the researchers’ 
perspective on the topic.  
In Experiment 2, the information about the audience’s perspective was bolded and 
highlighted in a different color font to draw participants’ attention and reduce the number of 
participants who failed the attention check item, which was also presented on the same page as 
the audience information. Participants were then asked to write a description of their memory to 
the audience they were assigned before completing dependent measures, or they were directed 
immediately to the dependent measures without providing a written description of their memory 
for the event. For participants who elaborated on their memory, the memory prompts were the 
same as Experiment 1. For participants who did not elaborate on their memory, the audience 
prompt stated, “the researchers in charge of this project are very interested in students’ 
experiences of [assigned memory topic]. They believe that [memory topic] can be a [positive or 
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negative] and [beneficial or harmful] experience for undergraduate students. They want to learn 
more about your experiences with this topic that they feel is [beneficial or harmful] for students.” 
All participants completed the shared reality measures followed by measures assessing 
the remaining dependent variables which were randomized in order. Finally, at the end of the 
experiment, participants completed measures assessing demographic information. They were 
then thanked for their participation and debriefed.  
Measures 
 
The same measures of memory characteristics, audience measures, event memory 
perceptions, attitudes of memory topic, self-typicality, shared reality, and demographics from 
Experiment 1 were used.  
Results 
Overview of Analyses 
 
The goals of Experiment 2 were to replicate findings from Experiment 1 and to determine 
if elaboration on one’s memory is necessary for audience perspective to influence subsequent 
attitudes, event memory perceptions, and self-typicality. The results from the attention and 
manipulation checks were examined first. Next, memory characteristics and audience measures 
were examined, for those who wrote memory descriptions, by both audience condition and by 
topic to determine whether essays differed across conditions. Descriptive analyses are also 
presented for all main dependent measures, followed by the main analyses for each outcome 
measure. A three-way univariate ANOVA was conducted for each dependent variable with 
audience condition, elaboration, and memory topic as between-subject factors. Lastly, 
moderation analyses are reported to examine whether shared reality again moderated the effects 





Participants were considered to have failed the attention check if they did not correctly list 
the audience perspective as positive in the positive audience condition, as negative in the 
negative audience condition, or as not mentioned in the no information condition. Those who did 
not correctly remember their audience’s attitude towards the memory topic (N = 29) were 
removed from all main analyses. In the positive audience condition, 3 (1%) participants failed 
the attention check, in the negative audience condition, only 1 (.3%) participant failed the 
attention check and in the no information condition, 25 (8%) participants failed the attention 
check. 
Manipulation Check 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of audience perspective on the perceived 
researchers’ attitudes of the memory topics, F(2, 295) = 641.94, p < .001, ηp
2 = .81, 95% CI [.52, 
.81]. As expected, participants rated the researchers’ attitudes on the memory topics to be more 
positive in the positive audience condition (M = 6.51, SD = .80) than both the negative audience 
condition (M = 1.68, SD = .77), p < .001, d = 6.15, 95% CI [5.49, 6.79] and the no information 
audience condition (M = 4.63, SD = 1.38), p < .001, d = 1.71, 95% CI [1.38, 2.05]. Additionally, 
participants rated the researchers’ attitudes as more negative in the negative audience condition 
than in the no information audience condition, p < .001, d = 2.64, 95% CI [2.33, 3.12]. These 
results suggest that the manipulation was successful in manipulating participants’ perceptions of 
the researchers’ perspectives on the memory topics.  
Memory Characteristics and Perceived Audience Influence. For those who elaborated 
on their memory, two-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effects of audience 
condition and memory topic on memory characteristics (word count, time since the event 
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occurred, importance of memory, emotional intensity of memory, enjoyment experienced when 
writing about the memory, ease of recall, or frequency of event disclosure), see Table 8. There 
were no main effects of audience condition on word count, time since the event occurred, 
importance of memory, emotional intensity, ease of recall, or frequency of event disclosure. 
However, there was an effect of audience on enjoyment experienced when writing about the 
memory such that participants in the negative audience condition reported enjoying writing about 
their experience more than participants in the no information condition, p = .006, d = 0.40, 95% 
CI [0.12, 0.69]. There was no difference between participants in the negative audience condition 
and the positive audience condition, p = .117, d = 0.21, 95% CI [0.00, 0.48] or between the 
positive audience condition and the no information audience condition, p = .208, d = 0.19, 95% 
CI [-0.10, 0.47].  
There was no main effect of memory topic on importance of memory, emotional 
intensity, or ease of recall. However, there were effects of topic on word count and enjoyment of 
writing, such that participants used more words (p < .01, d = 0.31, 95% CI [0.08, 0.54]) and 
reported more enjoyment (p = .048, d = 0.30, 95% CI [0.07, 0.53]) for group work memories 
than for multitasking memories. There was also an overall effect of topic on time since event 
occurred such that multitasking memories were more recent than group work memories, p < 
.001, d = 0.57, 95% CI [0.34, 0.80]. Participants also reported disclosing group work memories 
more often than multitasking memories, p < .001, d = 0.46, 95% CI [0.23, 0.69]. There were no 
effects of audience condition or memory topic on the degree to which participants reported 
thinking about their audience, including details for their audience, and believing their essay 






Table 8.  
Experiment 2 Means of Memory Characters and Audience Measures across Topics and Audience Conditions  
 Positive Audience Negative Audience No Information 
Audience 











Word Count 178.08 154.39 184.33 159.65 242.85 157.53 .032 .084** .029 
Time since event 
occurred 
2.11 1.57 2.33 1.35 2.25 1.60 .001 .086** .008 
Importance of 
memory 
2.95 2.79 3.30 2.69 3.00 3.00 .002 .005 .006 
Emotional Intensity 
of memory 
4.16 4.36 4.26 3.62 4.19 4.33 .012 .001 .020 
Enjoyment from 
writing 
4.24 3.71 4.67 4.19 3.88 3.27 .041* .027* .000 
Ease of recall 6.03 5.50 5.33 6.04 5.69 5.73 .001 .001 .034 
Frequency of 
disclosure 
2.58 2.11 3.63 1.81 2.88 2.40 .011 .068** .038 
Perceived Audience 
Influence  
4.20 3.79 3.58 4.03 3.75 3.96 .005 .001 .027 
Note. Results are based on two-way ANOVAs. *p < .05, **p < .01. Time since event occurred was measured on a scale from 1 (less 
than 1 month ago) to 7 (more than 10 years ago). Importance of memory, emotional intensity, enjoyment, and ease of recall were all 
measured on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Frequency of disclosure was measured on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 
7 (more than most events that have happened to me).  
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Descriptive results for main dependent variables. Descriptive statistics for all dependent 
variables are provided in Table 9. Additionally, a correlational analysis was conducted to 
examine the relationships among dependent variables and is provided in Table 10. As illustrated 
in the table below, attitudes toward topic, event memory perceptions, self-typicality, and essay 
valence were all positively associated. However, shared reality was not significantly correlated 
with any of the other variables.  
Table 9. 
Descriptives of Experiment 2 Outcome Measures 
 N M SD Range 
Shared reality 298 4.42 1.40 1 to 7 
Attitude toward topic 298 4.30 1.30 1 to 7 
Event memory perceptions 298 4.67 1.22 1 to 6 
Self typicality 298 5.00 1.05 1 to 7 
Essay valence 146 -0.07 0.88 -2 to 2 
 
Table 10 
Correlations among Experiment 2 Outcome Variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Shared reality -     
2. Attitude toward topic .095 -    
3. Event memory perceptions .096 .61** -   
4. Self typicality -.01 .31** .42** -  
5. Essay valence .01 .56** .67** .36** - 





Shared reality. Although there were no explicit predictions, a three-way ANOVA was 
conducted with elaboration, audience perspective, and memory topic as between-subject factors 
to examine whether message elaboration influenced perceptions of a shared reality. Analyses 
revealed non-significant main effects of elaboration, F(1, 286) = 0.16, p = .691, ηp
2 = .001, 95% 
CI [.00, .02], audience perspective, F(1, 140) = 0.84, p = .433, ηp
2 = .006, 95% CI [.00, .06], and 
memory topic, F(1, 140) = 0.17, p = .682, ηp
2 = .001, 95% CI [.00, .04]. These findings replicate 
Experiment 1.  
However, there was a significant interaction between memory topic and audience 
perspective, F(2, 286) = 7.29, p = .001, ηp
2 = .048, 95% CI [.01, .10] such that audience 
perspective had a significant effect for group work memories, F(2, 292) = 6.59, p = .002, ηp
2 = 
.043, 95% CI [.01, .09] but not for multitasking memories, F(2, 292) = 1.48, p = .229, ηp
2 = .010, 
95% CI [.00, .04]. For participants who were assigned to group work memories, there was 
greater shared reality in the positive audience condition (M = 4.90, SD = 1.39) than in the 
negative audience condition (M = 3.93, SD = 1.77), p < .001, d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.22, 1.00] and 
moderately more shared reality than in the no information condition (M = 4.34, SD = 0.77), p = 
.053, d = 0.48, 95% CI [0.06, 0.89]. Additionally, among those who were assigned to group 
work, the no information condition reported more shared reality than the negative audience 
condition, p < .001, d = 0.29, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.70]. The interaction between audience 
perspective and elaboration was non-significant, F(2, 286) = 2.66, p = .071, ηp
2 = .018, 95% CI 
[.00, .06]. The three-way interaction between topic, audience, and elaboration was also non-
significant, F(2, 286) = 0.13, p = .882, ηp





Figure 9. Experiment 2: Effects of elaboration, audience perspective, and memory topic on 
shared reality. 
Attitude toward topic. If message elaboration is a necessary component for the 
audience-bias effect, then we would expect a significant interaction between message elaboration 
and audience condition such that attitudes are biased in the direction of the audience after 
message elaboration but not biased when there is no elaboration. A three-way ANOVA was 
conducted on event memory perceptions with elaboration, audience perspective, and memory 
topic entered as between-subject factors. As predicted, results revealed a significant interaction 
between elaboration and audience perspective on subsequent memory topic attitudes, F(2, 298) = 
3.14, p = .045, ηp
2 = .021, 95% CI [.00, .06]. Planned contrasts indicated that for participants 
who elaborated on their memory, audience perspective had a significant effect on subsequent 
topic attitudes, F(2, 292) = 12.90, p < .001, ηp
2 = .081, 95% CI [.03, .14], such that writing to the 
positive audience led to more positive attitudes (M = 4.73, SD = 1.36) than writing to the 
negative audience (M = 3.89, SD = 1.17), p < .001, d = 0.66, 95% CI [0.28, 1.02] or the no 
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audience perspective had no effect on attitudes for participants who did not elaborate on their 
memory, F(2, 292) = 3.11, p = .145, ηp
2 = .02, 95% CI [.00, .06], see Figure 10.  
Additionally, there was an overall main effect of audience perspective, F(2, 298) = 5.76, 
p = .004, ηp
2 = .039, and an overall main effect of memory topic on subsequent attitudes, F(1, 
298) = 18.05, p < .001, ηp
2 = .057, 95% CI [0.17, .11]. Post hoc analyses revealed that 
participants in the positive audience condition had more positive attitudes (M = 4.59, SD = 1.36) 
than participants in the negative audience condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.26), p = .001, d = 0.45, 
95% CI [0.18, 0.72], but not than participants in the no information audience condition (M = 
4.33, SD = 1.43), p = .154, d = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.49]. There was also no difference in 
attitudes between participants in the negative audience condition and participants in the no 
information audience condition, p = .065, d = 0.27, 95% CI [-.01, 0.56]. Additionally, 
participants also had more positive attitudes in the group work condition (M = 4.64, SD = 1.31) 
than in the multitasking condition (M = 3.98, SD = 1.20), p < .001, d = 0.53, 95% CI [0.29, 0.75]. 
There was no overall main effect of elaboration, F(1, 298) = 2.71, p = .101, ηp
2 = .009, 
95% CI [.00, .04]. Lastly, there was no interaction between audience condition and memory 
topic, F(2, 298) = 0.29, p = .746, ηp
2 = .002, 95% CI [.00, .02], between elaboration and memory 
topic, F(2, 298) = 1.72, p = .191, ηp
2 = .006, 95% CI [.00, .01], and no three-way interaction 
between audience condition, memory topic, and elaboration, F(2, 298) = 2.44, p = .089, ηp
2 = 





Figure 10. Experiment 2: Effects of elaboration, audience perspective, and memory topic on 
attitudes.  
Event Memory Perceptions. If message elaboration is a necessary component for the 
audience-bias effect, then we would expect a significant interaction between message elaboration 
and audience condition such that perceptions are biased after message elaboration but not biased 
when there is no elaboration. A three-way ANOVA was conducted on event memory perceptions 
with elaboration, audience perspective, and memory topic entered as between-subject factors. As 
predicted, results revealed a significant interaction between elaboration and audience perspective 
on subsequent ratings of event memory perceptions F(2, 286) = 4.38, p = .013, ηp
2 = .030, 95% 
CI [.00, .07].  
Planned contrasts indicated that, replicating Experiment 1, for participants who 
elaborated on their memory, audience had a significant effect on subsequent ratings of event 
memory perceptions, F(2, 292) = 5.80, p = .003, ηp
2 = .038, 95% CI [.00, .09] such that the 
positive audience led to more positive perceptions (M = 5.09, SD = 1.23) than the negative 
audience (M = 4.44, SD = 1.30), p = .003, d = 0.51, 95% CI [0.15, 0.88], and the no information 
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in event memory perceptions between those who wrote to the negative audience and those who 
wrote to the no information audience was not statistically significant, p = .849, d = 0.04, 95% CI 
[-0.40, 0.48]. Additionally, participants who were not given an opportunity to elaborate on their 
memory showed no difference in subsequent event memory perceptions, F(2, 292) = 1.97, p = 
.142, ηp
2 = .013, 95% CI [.00, .05].  
Overall, there was also no main effect of audience, F(1, 298) = 2.39, p = 0.94, ηp
2 = .01, 
95% CI [.00, .04], or elaboration opportunity, F(1, 298) = .106, p = .745, ηp
2 = .000, 95% CI 
[.00, .02] on event memory perceptions. However, there was a significant main effect of memory 
topic, F(1, 298) = 26.69, p < .001, ηp
2 = .085, 95% CI [.03, .15], such that participants rated 
group work memories as more positive (M = 5.04, SD = 1.07) than multitasking memories (M = 
4.32, SD = 1.26), p < .001, d = 0.62, 95% CI [0.38, 0.85]. 
Finally, results revealed an unpredicted significant three-way interaction of elaboration, 
audience perspective, and memory topic on subsequent event memory perceptions, F(2, 298) = 
3.46, p = .033, ηp
2 = .024, 95% CI [.00, .06]. Post hoc analyses revealed that within the 
multitasking memory condition, audience perspective had a significant effect for participants 
who elaborated on their memory, F(2, 286) = 5.86, p = .003, ηp
2 = .039, 95% CI [0.00, .09] but 
not for participants who did not elaborate on their memory, F(2, 286) = 1.02, p = .362, ηp
2 = 
.007, 95% CI [.00, .03]. However, within the group work memory condition, audience 
perspective did not predict event memory perceptions for participants who elaborated, F(2, 286) 
= 1.75, p = .175, ηp
2 = .012, 95% CI [.00, .04], nor for participants who did not elaborate, F(2, 
286) = 2.39, p = .093, ηp





Figure 11. Experiment 2: Three-way interaction of audience perspective, elaboration, and 
memory topic on subsequent event memory perceptions.  
Self-typicality. If message elaboration is a necessary component for the audience-
congruence bias, then we would again expect a significant interaction between message 
elaboration and audience condition such that memories are reported as being more self-typical in 
the positive audience condition when there is message elaboration but not when there is no 
message elaboration. A three-way ANOVA was conducted with elaboration, audience 
perspective, and memory topic entered as between-subject factors. Similar to Experiment 1, there 
was a non-significant effect of audience perspective, F(2, 298) = 2.45, p = .088, ηp
2 = .017, 95% 
CI [.00, .05] or memory topic, F(1, 298) = 2.20, p = .139, ηp
2 = .008, 95% CI [.00, .04]. 
However, there was a significant effect of elaboration, F(1, 298) = 4.55, p = .034, ηp
2 = .02, 95% 
CI [.00, .05] such that elaboration led to higher ratings of self-typicality (M = 5.14, SD = 1.08) 
than not elaborating (M = 4.86, SD = 1.01), d = 0.27, 95% CI [.0.04, 0.50]. There was no 
interaction between audience perspective and elaboration, F(2, 298) = 2.27, p = .105, ηp
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95% CI [.00, .05] or between audience perspective and memory topic, F(2, 298) = 0.02, p = .979, 
ηp
2 = .00, 95% CI [.00, .00]. The three-way interaction between audience perspective, 
elaboration, and memory topic was not statistically significant, F(2, 298) = 0.97, p = .379, ηp
2 = 
.007, 95% CI [.00, .03]. These results are displayed in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Experiment 2: Effects of elaboration, audience perspective, and memory topic on self-
typicality.  
Essay Valence 
Memory descriptions for those who were asked to elaborate on their memories (N = 146) 
were again analyzed using LIWC software and by two independent coders blind to experimental 
conditions. Essays were coded in the same eight ways as in Experiment 1. Because statistical 
analyses indicated similar patterns for each coded dimension, only results for overall essay 
valence are reported below. See Appendix B for additional analyses and the correlation matrix 
for all coded variables.  
First, a two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of topic on the inclusion of positive 
emotion words, F(1, 140) = 3.89, p = .050, ηp
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of audience condition, F(1, 140) = 1.45, p = .239, ηp
2 = .01, 95% CI [.00, .07], and a non-
significant interaction between topic and audience, , F(2, 140) = 0.35, p = .707, ηp
2 = .01, 95% 
CI [.00, .04]. Participants included more positive emotion words in the group work condition (M 
= 2.67, SD = 1.62) than in the multitasking condition (M = 2.09, SD = 1.84), d = 0.34, 95% CI 
[0.02, 0.67].  
Additionally, a two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of audience condition on the 
inclusion of negative emotion words, F(1, 140) = 4.18, p = .017, ηp
2 = .03, 95% CI [.00, .10], but 
no effect of topic, F(1, 140) = 1.52, p = .219, ηp
2 = .01, 95% CI [.00, .07], or interaction between 
audience and topic, F(2, 140) = 0.53, p = .589, ηp
2 = .01, 95% CI [.00, .05]. Participants in the no 
information audience condition included more negative emotion words (M = 1.56, SD = 0.94) 
than participants in the positive audience condition (M = 1.00, SD = 0.86), p = .006, d = 0.62, 
95% CI [0.18, 1.09], and negative audience condition (M = 1.07, SD = 0.91), p = .019, d = 0.53, 
95% CI [0.07, 1.00]. There was no difference between participants in the positive audience 
condition and the negative audience condition, p = .691, d = 0.34, 95% CI [.0.02, 0.67]. Overall, 
there was no consistent evidence from the LIWC software that participants tuned their essay 
descriptions in the direction of their audience’s perspective.  
Lastly, a two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of audience condition on the overall 
coded essay valence, F(1, 140) = 4.79, p = .010, ηp
2 = .03, 95% CI [.00, .11] but no effect of 
memory topic, F(1, 140) = 1.05, p = .307, ηp
2 = .007, 95% CI [.00, .06], or interaction, F(2, 140) 
= 1.18, p = .309, ηp
2 = .02, 95% CI [.00, .07]. Participants in the positive audience condition had 
more positively rated essays (M = 0.19, SD = 0.80) than participants in the no information 
audience condition (M = -.30, SD = 0.83), p = .011, d = 0.60, 95% CI [0.16, 1.06], and 
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participants in the negative audience condition (M = -0.25, SD = 0.92), p = .005, d = 0.51, 95% 
CI [0.15, 0.89]. These analyses provide the first evidence of tuning in this project.  
Moderation of Shared Reality  
It was originally hypothesized that shared reality would mediate the effects of audience 
perspective on subsequent attitudes and memory perceptions. However, given the lack of a 
causal relationship of audience perspective on shared reality, as reported above, a mediation 
analysis was no longer deemed appropriate. Therefore, moderation analyses were conducted 
instead in an attempt to replicate the exploratory findings from Experiment 1.  
Moderation of Shared Reality on Attitudes. As was found in Experiment 1, it was 
hypothesized that the audience-bias effect would be more pronounced for individuals who 
achieve greater shared reality. Dummy coding was again used for the independent variable (see 
Table 11). The positive audience condition was chosen as the reference group in order to 
compare 1) the difference between the positive and negative audience conditions and 2) the 
difference between the positive and no information audience conditions. Therefore, the first 
dummy coded variable shows the difference on memory attitudes between participants in the 
positive audience condition and participants in the negative audience condition. The beta value 
describes the change in attitudes due to a unit increase in the predictor, which represents a 
change from the positive audience condition (coded as 0) to the negative audience condition 
(coded as 1). The interaction of the negative audience condition by shared reality represents the 
change in attitudes between the positive audience condition and the negative audience condition 






Dummy Coding for Moderation Analyses 
Audience Condition Dummy coded variable 1 
(Positive vs. Negative Audience) 
Dummy coded variable 2 (Positive 
vs. No Information Audience) 
Positive Audience 0 0 
Negative Audience 1 0 
No Information Audience 0 1 
 
Results revealed a significant interaction between the negative audience condition and 
shared reality, b = -1.34, t(292) = -17.06, p < .001, suggesting that shared reality does moderate 
the effects of audience on attitudes between participants in the positive and negative audience 
conditions. To interpret the moderation effect, conditional effects were calculated at one standard 
deviation above and below the mean of shared reality. Conditional effects at one standard 
deviation above the mean of shared reality indicated the expected effect of audience condition on 
attitudes at higher levels of shared reality, b = -2.45, t(292) = -14.80, p < .001, with participants 
reporting more negative attitudes in the negative audience condition than participants in the 
positive audience condition. Additionally, conditional effects at one standard deviation below the 
mean of shared reality indicated a significant effect in the opposite direction, b = 1.29, t(292) = 
7.81, p < .001, such that participants reported more positive attitudes in the negative audience 
condition than in the positive audience condition.  
The next analysis explored the difference of memory topic attitudes between participants 
in the positive audience condition and participants in the no information condition. The 
interaction between the no information audience condition and shared reality was also 
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significant, b = -0.46, t(292) = -3.23, p = .001, suggesting that the difference in attitudes between 
participants in the positive audience condition and the no information condition is also 
moderated by shared reality. To interpret the moderation effect, conditional effects were 
calculated at one standard deviation above and below the mean of shared reality. Conditional 
effects at one standard deviation above the mean of shared reality indicated that participants 
reported more negative attitudes in the no information condition than in the positive audience 
condition, b = -0.81, t(292) = -3.46, p = .001. Additionally, conditional effects at one standard 
deviation below the mean of shared reality were not statistically significant, b = 0.47, t(292) = 
1.94, p = .054. The overall interaction of audience condition and shared reality resulted in a 
significant increase in variance explained compared to a model with only main effects, R2 = 
.48, F(2, 292) = 146.95, p < .001. These results are reported in Table 12 and displayed in Figure 
13. 
As in Experiment 1, I also explored whether the moderation of shared reality on memory 
topic attitudes differed by memory topic. I again used Model 3 of Hayes’ (2017) PROCESS 
macro to examine these effects. Memory topic explained an additional 2% of variance in the 
model, R2 = .02, F(2, 286) = 6.90, p = .001. Results revealed a non-significant interaction 
between the negative audience condition, shared reality, and memory topic, b = -0.22, t(286) = -
1.39, p = .166, suggesting that the moderation of shared reality on the effect of audience 
perspective on attitudes does not differ by memory topic for participants in the negative audience 
condition. However, there was a significant interaction between the no information audience 
condition, shared reality, and memory topic, b = 0.80, t(286) = 2.89, p = .004.  
Conditional effects at one standard deviation below the mean of shared reality indicated 
that for multitasking memories, participants in the no information condition had more positive 
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attitudes than participants in the positive audience condition, b = 0.77, t(286) = 2.31, p = .022. 
However, for group work memories, there was no difference in attitudes between participants in 
the no information condition and participants in the positive audience condition, b = 0.08, t(286) 
= 0.23, p = .821. Additionally, conditional effects at one standard deviation above the mean of 
shared reality indicated that for multitasking memories, participants in the no information 
condition has less positive attitudes than participants in the positive audience condition, b = -
1.45, t(286) = -4.60,  p < .001. However, for group work memories, there was again no 
difference in attitudes between participants in the no information condition and participants in 
the positive audience condition, b = 0.10, t(286) = 0.30, p = .763. Lastly, I used Model 3 of 
Hayes’ (2017) PROCESS macro to explore whether the moderation of shared reality on the 
effect of audience perspective on topic attitudes differed for those who elaborated compared to 
those who did not elaborate. Results indicated that the moderation of shared reality did not differ 
as a function of elaboration, R2 < .01, F(2, 286) = 0.07, p = .932. 
Table 12 
Experiment 2: Regression analysis of shared reality and audience on attitudes 
 B 
95% CI 
SE T P 
Constant 4.50 
[4.33, 4.67] 
.09 50.96 <.001 
Negative Audience -0.58 
[-0.82, -0.33] 
.12 -4.67 <.001 
No Information Aud. -0.17 
[-0.43, 0.09] 
.13 -1.30 .194 
Shared Reality (centered) 0.74 
[0.63, 0.85] 
.06 13.19 <.001 
Negative Aud. x SR -1.34 
[-1.49, -1.18] 
.08 -17.06 <.001 
No Information x SR -0.46 
[-0.73, -0.18] 
.14 -3.23 .001 





Figure 13. Experiment 2: Interaction of Shared Reality and Audience on Attitudes 
Moderation of Shared Reality on Event Memory Perceptions. Participants who 
reported greater shared reality should again demonstrate more pronounced audience-bias effects, 
such that those in the positive audience condition should report more positive event memory 
perceptions and those in the negative audience condition should report more negative event 
memory perceptions as compared to participants who reported less shared reality. Results 
revealed a significant interaction between the negative audience condition and shared reality, b = 
-.98, t(292) = -11.04, p < .001, indicating that shared reality does moderate the effects of 
audience on event memory perceptions between participants in the positive and negative 
audience conditions. To interpret the moderation effect, conditional effects were calculated at 
one standard deviation above and below the mean of shared reality. Conditional effects at one 
standard deviation above the mean indicated the expected effect of audience condition at higher 
levels of shared reality, b = -1.74, t(292) = -9.24, p < .001, with participants reporting more 
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condition. Additionally, conditional effects calculated at one standard deviation below the mean 
of shared reality indicated a significant effect in the opposite direction, b = 1.01, t(292) = 5.38, p 
< .001, such that participants reported more positive memories in the negative audience 
condition compared to the positive audience condition.  
The interaction between the no information audience condition and shared reality was 
also significant, b = -0.46, t(292) = 0.03, p = .005, suggesting that the effect of audience 
condition on event memory perceptions is also moderated by shared reality for participants in the 
no information condition compared to participants in the positive audience condition. 
Conditional effects at one standard deviation above the mean indicated that participants reported 
more negative event memory perceptions in the no information condition than in the positive 
audience condition, b = -0.72, t(292) = -2.72, p < .007. Additionally, conditional effects 
calculated at one standard deviation below the mean of shared reality indicated a significant 
effect in the opposite direction, b = 0.56, t(292) = 2.04, p = .042, such that participants reported 
more positive memories in the no information condition compared to the positive audience 
condition. The overall interaction of audience condition and shared reality resulted in a 
significant increase in explained variance compared to a model with only main effects, R2 = 
.29, F(2, 292) = 60.93, p < .001. These results are reported in Table 13 and displayed in Figure 
14. 
Additional analyses were again conducted to explore if the moderation of shared reality 
on event memory perceptions differed by memory topic or elaboration. All analyses were 
conducted using Model 3 of Hayes’ (2017) PROCESS macro. First, results were consistent with 
Experiment 1 such that the moderation of shared reality on the effect of audience perspective on 
event memory perceptions did not significantly differ by memory topic, R2 < .01, F(2, 286) = 
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0.36, p = .701. Additionally, results did not significantly differ by elaboration, R2 < .01, F(2, 
286) = 0.78, p = .458. 
Table 13 
Regression analysis of shared reality and audience on event memory perceptions 
 B 
95% CI 
SE T P 
Constant 4.78 
[4.58, 4.98] 
.10 47.75 <.001 
Negative Audience -0.36 
[-0.64, -0.09] 
.14 -2.58 .010 
No Information Audience -0.08 
[-0.38, 0.21] 
0.15 -0.54 .588 
Shared Reality (centered) 0.57 
[0.45, 0.70] 
.06 9.02 <.001 
Negative Audience x SR -0.98 
[-1.15, -0.80] 
.09 -11.04 <.001 
No Information x SR -0.46 
[-0.77, -0.14] 
.16 -2.85 .005 
Note. Overall model, R2 = .31, R2 = .29. 
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Experiment 2 Discussion 
The goals of Experiment 2 were to replicate findings from Experiment 1 and to examine 
whether message elaboration is a necessary component of the audience-bias effect. It was 
predicted that participants writing for a positive audience would again demonstrate more positive 
memory topic attitudes and event memory perceptions than participants writing for a negative 
audience. Additionally, if elaboration is a necessary component of the audience-bias effect, then 
these effects should be more pronounced for individuals who elaborated on their memory than 
those who did not. Lastly, as in Experiment 1, it was predicted that shared reality would 
moderate the effects of audience perspective on memory topic attitudes and event memory 
perceptions such that the audience-bias effect should be more pronounced for individuals who 
achieve greater shared reality.  
Consistent with the elaboration as a necessary component hypothesis, the results 
demonstrated an interaction of message elaboration and audience perspective for memory topic 
attitudes and event memory perceptions such that, for participants who elaborated on their 
memory, those in the positive audience condition had more positive attitudes and event memory 
perceptions than those in the negative audience condition. These results provide a direct 
replication of Experiment 1 and also indicate that elaboration is an important component of the 
audience-bias effect. Although, there was also a significant three-way interaction of audience 
perspective, elaboration, and memory topic on event memory perceptions such that results were 
consistent with predictions for participants who wrote about multitasking but not for participants 
who wrote about group work. These findings highlight the complexity of the audience-bias effect 
as it relates to autobiographical memories and suggest the possibility of additional moderators 
that may influence when elaboration is necessary. Previous research suggests that when trust in 
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one’s audience is high, message production may not be necessary for the audience-bias effect to 
occur (Echterhoff & Schmalbach, 2018). 
Also consistent with Experiment 1, there were no main effects of audience perspective on 
perceptions of shared reality or self-typicality. Message elaboration also did not appear to 
influence shared reality, although, elaboration did lead to higher ratings of self-typicality. 
Additionally, effects of audience perspective on essay valence for participants who elaborated on 
their memory was examined using both LIWC software and coded essay valence. According to 
the LIWC calculations, there was no effect of audience on positive emotion words. However, 
participants who wrote to a negative audience did include more negative emotion words than 
participants writing for a positive audience. There was also a main effect of audience perspective 
on coded scores of essay valence such that essays of participants who wrote to a positive 
audience were rated more positively than those of participants who wrote to a negative audience. 
Although these findings are not consistent with findings from Experiment 1, this suggests that 
participants may have tuned their memory descriptions to be consistent with the perspective of 
their audience. Additional research is needed to understand whether participants actually tune 
their autobiographical memories to their audience and how to best measure this process. Lastly, 
moderation analyses indicated that the audience-bias effect was more pronounced for individuals 
who achieved greater shared reality compared to those who achieved less shared reality for both 
memory topic attitudes and event memory perceptions. These findings were also consistent with 
findings from Experiment 1.  
In conclusion, Experiment 2 suggests that the effect of audience perspective on memory 
topic attitudes and event memory perceptions is robust and that message elaboration does appear 
to be an important component of this process. Additionally, shared reality also appears to be an 
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important moderator of this effect which is consistent with Experiment 1 and previous literature 
(Echterhoff et al., 2008). Participants also consistently rated group work memories as more 
positive than multitasking memories, and the effects of elaboration appear to be slightly stronger 
for memories related to multitasking than group work. Future work in this area should explore 
further how the topic of the memory relates to these processes.  
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current project examined the extent to which the audience with whom individuals 
communicate about personal events influences how the event is described and later perceived by 
the communicator. Experiment 1 examined how describing a memory to an audience who either 
has a positive perspective, a negative perspective, or whose perspective is unknown influenced 
subsequent attitudes about the memory topic, perceptions of the memory, and the self-typicality 
of the memory. The results of this experiment were consistent with my hypotheses that 
communicating with an audience who has a positive perspective on the memory topic leads to 
more positive attitudes and event memory perceptions than communicating with an audience 
who has a negative perspective on the memory topic. The effects of audience perspective on 
attitudes and event memory perceptions were stronger for individuals who experienced a shared 
reality with their audience. However, contrary to expectations, the actual essay descriptions did 
not illustrate differences in positive or negative valence across audience conditions. Also 
contrary to my predictions, audience perspective did not affect the perceived self-typicality of 
memories. The current project is the first empirical investigation to directly apply the concepts of 
audience tuning and shared reality to communication about autobiographical memories. These 
findings also extend previous literature on the co-construction of autobiographical memories and 
illustrate novel ways in which one’s audience can influence subsequent perceptions of these 
events.  
Additionally, Experiment 2 examined whether message elaboration is a necessary 
component of the audience-bias effect. According to the saying-is-believing effect, simply 
learning about a new perspective will not bias one’s own memory if the memory is not tuned 
accordingly (Higgins, 1999). Therefore, if elaboration is a necessary component of this process, 
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then it was expected that only participants who elaborated on their memory would experience the 
audience-bias effect, compared to participants who did not elaborate on their memory. The 
results from Experiment 2 partially supported this hypothesis such that participants who 
elaborated demonstrated attitudes and event memory perceptions that were more consistent with 
the perspective of their audience than participants who did not elaborate. Additionally, the 
audience-bias effects were again stronger for those who experienced greater shared reality. 
However, the findings of Experiment 2 were more complex than anticipated such that effects of 
elaboration varied across topics. Therefore, it is possible that other mechanisms also influence 
this process, such as trust in audience which may vary by memory topic. Previous research 
suggests that under some circumstances, the audience-bias effect may occur without message 
elaboration (Echterhoff & Schmalbach, 2018). For instance, when an audience’s judgement is 
perceived as highly trustworthy, the audience may lead to biases in subsequent attitudes without 
message elaboration.  
It was surprising that message elaboration appeared to strengthen the audience-bias effect 
despite the lack of evidence for tuning. The audience-bias effect on subsequent attitudes is 
typically conceptualized as resulting from a shared reality with one’s audience which is created 
via actively tuning a message description to the audience (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005). 
However, the current project suggests that this explanation may not fully account for the 
underlying psychological processes. For instance, the current findings suggest that participants 
did not actively tune their memory descriptions to the perspective of their audience nor did they 
always experience a shared reality, yet audience nonetheless impacted subsequent attitudes and 
event memory perceptions. One explanation for this paradoxical finding is that participants may 
be relying on the availability heuristic, which suggests that a judgement is determined by the 
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relevant information that is most accessible at the time of the judgement (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973).  
According to the availability heuristic model, judgements are comprised of both the 
subjective ease of which relevant information is accessible in memory and the amount of 
information that is accessible in memory. Others have conceptualized this distinction as affective 
versus cognitive information (Breckler & Wiggins, 1989). In the case of the audience-bias effect, 
participants are asked to make a judgement about a relatively neutral or ambiguous topic. The 
perspective of the audience serves as the affective basis for the judgement. The affective 
judgement may then be strengthened via cognitive elaboration of one’s own experience, even 
when the elaboration is not itself affect-based. Rather, the importance of elaboration may be due 
to an increase in the amount of information that is available when participants are later asked to 
make a judgement. Therefore, the availability heuristic model helps explain the importance of 
elaboration even in the absence of audience-tuning. However, additional research is needed to 
fully understand the role of elaboration and other psychological processes that may impact how 
communication of personal events may influence subsequent judgements.  
The current project adds to the plethora of research on the malleability and reconstructive 
nature of autobiographical memory, with a focus on social influences. By combining research on 
audience tuning and autobiographical memories, the present findings suggest that similar 
processes and corresponding biases that occur when individuals communicate social attitudes 
may also occur when individuals communicate about their own experiences. This is consistent 
with a host of literature examining how communication about experiences can alter the speaker’s 
perceptions of the experience (Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz, & Groll, 2008; Higgins & Groll, 
2005; Tversky & Marsh, 2000). In particular, this work underscores the importance of who one 
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chooses to share these events with and the subtle ways that audience may alter event memory 
perceptions.  
Many of the classic findings on false and distorted memory have focused on more overt 
ways that memory can become distorted such as by providing individuals with misinformation 
that becomes incorporated into the original memory (Loftus, 2005) or by presenting word lists 
that may prime individuals into false recall of words that were absent from the list (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). The idea that speakers’ memory for experiences can be biased by their own 
communication about these experiences is arguably less intuitive than the notion that memory 
becomes distorted through the exposure of additional information. Therefore, it is important that 
researchers continue to examine the complex dynamics by which communication and its 
underlying motivations reshape memories and may impact how they become integrated with the 
self. It is possible that various forms of social influence from other research domains may also 
serve as tools for memory researchers as they seek to understand the different types of social 
influence on memory.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The current project provides evidence that shared reality is an important component of the 
audience-biasing effect in relation to autobiographical events. Specifically, the predicted effect 
was larger for individuals who also reported experiencing a shared reality with their audience. 
However, an important limitation of the current project is that participants did not record pre-
manipulation attitudes and event memory perceptions. Therefore, the current project cannot 
determine the causal nature of shared reality on subsequent perceptions. In other words, it is 
possible that audience perspective had larger effects for individuals who already agreed with the 
perspective of their audience and thus, because of this congruence, also naturally experienced 
more shared reality. Although, the main effects of audience condition on subsequent memory 
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attitudes and memory perceptions suggest that individuals were biased by the audience despite 
previous attitudes about the topic.  
Lastly, it is surprising that there was little evidence that audience perspective influenced 
actual memory descriptions, as previous literature typically finds that individuals tune their 
message descriptions to be aligned with the perspective of their audience (Higgins, 1999). 
However, it is possible that individuals were tuning in a way that was not detected, as the 
memories chosen for this project were relatively neutral topics and unimportant. It is possible 
that tuning may be more pronounced for more emotional memory topics.  
Although outside the scope of this project, future studies should explore possible 
boundary conditions for the audience-bias effect regarding autobiographical memories. For 
instance, differences across the various memory topics suggest the possibility of additional 
moderators of this effect. Researchers tend to treat memory topics similarly or merely separate 
them into positive and negative experiences. However, despite the pilot study demonstrating that 
that the memory topics used in Experiment 1 were evaluatively similar, the findings across both 
experiments suggest that there may be subtle but important differences in memory topics that 
impact how these memories are reflected on. Future research should further explore underlying 
mechanisms that may help explain the differences found across memory topics such as whether 
importance to the self-concept or trust in audience may influence these processes. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the current project provides insight into how memories may become 
distorted through telling (Marsh & Tversky, 2004) and how people use the perspectives of others 
to help reconstruct and make sense of past experiences. This work has important implications as 
autobiographical memories influence how we think about our past, how we plan for the future, 
and how we view our current self (Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005). As described by 
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Smorti, “autobiography in its double sides — that of memory and that of narrative — is a process 
of continuous construction that is deeply linked to social relations” (2011). The present 
investigation is the first to provide evidence that the perspective of an audience whom one shares 
a memory with can lead to subsequent attitudes and perceptions about the memory that are more 
consistent with the audience perspective.  
Additionally, the desire to achieve a shared reality with one’s audience appears to be a 
key component of this process. Within the area of autobiographical memory, shared reality is a 
relatively new and unexplored topic that warrants further investigation. Understanding how 
shared reality aids in memory construction also has important implications for other social 
phenomena such as group identity and consensus. Future work should continue to explore the 
role that social influences have on memory and how people use communication of their 
memories to help them achieve a deeper understanding of what is real and meaningful not only 
about the world but also about themselves.  
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APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENT 1 ESSAY CODED VARIABLES 
Table 13 
Experiment 1: Correlation Matrix for Essay coded variables 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Positivity -        
2. Negativity -.42** -       
3. Overall 
Valence 
.70** -.83** -      
4. Positivity at 
End 
.69** -.45** .76** -     
5. Negativity at 
End 
-.50** .74** -.80** -.62** -    
6. Overall 
Valence of End 
.67** -.63** .87** .88** -.86 -   
7. Positive 
Consequences 
.69** -.44** .69** .75** -.56 .74** -  
8. Negative 
Consequences 
-.42** .72** -.69** -.50** .68** -.63** -.42 - 







Experiment 1: Means of Coded Essay Variables across conditions 























Positivity 0.50 0.81 0.86 0.72 0.83 0.75 0.33 0.80 0.67 .010 .033 .011 
Negativity 0.66 0.67 0.62 0.94 0.81 0.75 0.60 0.50 0.98 .018 .008 .041 
Overall 
Valence 
-.21 .28 .21 -.47 .03 .02 -.27 .20 -.30 .010 .033 .010 
Positivity at 
End 
0.55 0.86 0.93 0.64 0.97 0.82 0.42 0.95 0.70 .007 .062** .009 
Negativity at 
End 




-.05 0.42 0.33 -0.08 0.36 0.20 -0.25 0.38 -0.05 .006 .034 .003 
Positive 
Consequences 
0.53 0.69 0.69 0.44 0.72 0.70 0.38 0.75 0.55 .006 .063** .009 
Negative 
Consequences 
0.68 0.67 0.52 0.83 0.78 0.61 0.75 0.53 0.73 .012 .018 .025 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
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APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENT 2 ESSAY CODED VARIABLES 
 
Table 15.  
Experiment 2: Correlation Matrix for Essay coded variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Positivity -        
2. Negativity -.41** -       
3. Overall 
Valence 
.83** -.78** -      
4. Positivity at 
End 
.87** -.36** .75** -     
5. Negativity at 
End 
-.50** .83** -.76** -.50** -    
6. Overall 
Valence of End 
.80** -.64** .89** .86** -.83** -   
7. Positive 
Consequences 
.85** -.36** .76** .83** -.49** .76** -  
8. Negative 
Consequences 
-.48** .79** -.74** -.42** .75** -.66** -.43** - 
























Table 16.  
Experiment 2: Means of Coded Essay Variables across conditions 
 Positive Audience Negative Audience No Information Audience Audience Topic Interaction 










Positivity 0.45 0.76 0.31 0.56 0.30 0.54 .03 .06** .00 
Negativity 0.50 0.41 0.65 .69 0.57 0.92 .06** .01 .03 
Overall Valence -.05 .38 -.35 -.17 -.23 -.38 .06** .01 .02 
Positivity at 
End 
0.52 0.85 0.31 0.56 0.37 0.58 .06* .06** .00 
Negativity at 
End 
0.36 0.31 0.62 0.63 0.50 0.73 .08** .00 .01 
Overall Valence 
at End 
0.13 0.49 -.33 -.13 -.17 -.04 .07** .02 .00 
Positive 
Consequences 
0.45 0.68 0.25 0.46 0.30 0.46 .05* .05* .00 
Negative 
Consequences 
0.54 0.32 0.77 0.63 0.63 0.92 .11** .00 .05* 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
 
 
 
